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Although it iswidely recognised that Ash‘arism enters the sixth/twelfth centurywitha physicalist theory of man and exits with an Avicennan-inspired body-souldualism, the exact nature and circumstances of this conversion, one of the starkest
andmostmomentous shifts in school doctrine, remain little understood.1 In contrast to the
considerable attention that al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s theory of the soul, the earliest episode in the
post-classical era, has received in recent scholarship, there are hitherto no focused studies
on pre-Ghaza¯lian classical Ash‘arı¯ anthropology beyond a brief, but valuable, treatment
of some of the school-founder’s teachings.2 In relative terms, the interest that Mu‘tazilı¯
anthropology has received is immense.3 Our immediate objective in the present article is to
address this gap by offering a comprehensive exploration of the theory of man expounded
in the available classical Ash‘arı¯ sources. A forthcoming study will then investigate the
concerns and circumstances that were at play in the radical, but gradual, transformation
that Ash‘arı¯ anthropology underwent during the late-fifth/eleventh and sixth/twelfth
centuries, including criticisms of the philosophical theory of the rational soul.
1 I would like to thank the editor of The Muslim World, Prof. Yahya Michot, for arranging the
anonymous peer review of this article and for his comments.
2 Daniel Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-Ash‘arı¯ (Paris: Cerf, 1990), based largely on Ibn Fu¯rak’s conspectus
of al-Ash‘arı¯’s theology, Mujarrad maqa¯la¯t al-Ash‘arı¯. Exact page references are given below.
3 For instance: Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, 6 vols.
(Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991–1995), passim; Wilferd Madelung, “Ibn al-Mala¯h· imı¯ on
the Human Soul,” The Muslim World 102.3 (2012): 426–32; Margaretha Heemskerk, “‘Abd al-Jabba¯r
al-Hamadha¯nı¯ on Body, Soul and Resurrection,” in A Common Rationality: Mu‘tazilism in Islam and
Judaism, eds. C. Adang and S. Schmidtke (Würzburg: Ergon, 2007), 127–56; Sophia Vasalou, “Subject
and Body in Mu‘tazilism, or: Mu‘tazilite Kala¯m and the Fear of Triviality,” Arabic Sciences and
Philosophy 17 (2007): 267–98; Richard Frank, Beings and their Attributes (Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press, 1978), 39–52; Majid Fakhry, “The Mu‘tazilite View of Man,” in Recherches
d’islamologie: Recueil d’articles offert à Georges C. Anawati et Louis Gardet par leurs collègues et amis
(Leuven: Peeters, 1977), 107–21; J. Peters, God’s Created Speech (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 1976),
159 ff.; ‘Abd al-Karı¯m ‘Uthma¯n, Naz·ariyyat al-taklı¯f: a¯ra¯’ ‘Abd al-Jabba¯r al-kala¯miyya (Beirut:
Mu’assasat al-Risa¯la, 1971), 305 ff.; Isma‘il al-Fa¯ru¯qı¯, “The Self in Mu‘tazila Thought,” International
Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1966): 366–88.
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The present study will explore the ontological structure of man, particularly the basic
and interrelated elements of body, the attribute of life, and spirit. Our scope thus
excludes the detailed dissection of the properties and workings of the further attributes
that characterise man, including knowledge, perception, will and capacity, some of
which are treated elsewhere, for instance in studies on kala¯m epistemology, theories of
action and doctrines of divine attributes. Nor do we intend to cover any eschatological
discussions, including the inquisition in the grave, except where they shed light on
human ontology in this world.
By “classical Ash‘arism”, I refer to the earlier phase that drew mainly on Bas·ran
Mu‘tazilism and Traditionalist theology, in contrast to neo-Ash‘arism, which took its cue
chiefly from classical Ash‘arism and Avicennan philosophy. Classical Ash‘arı¯s thus
include, first of all, members of the school who lived in the fourth/tenth century and the
first three quarters of the fifth/eleventh century, including al-Ash‘arı¯ (d. 324/936),
al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ (d. 403/1013), Ibn Fu¯rak (d. 406/1015), ‘Abd al-Qa¯hir al-Baghda¯dı¯ (d.
429/1038), al-Qushayrı¯ (d. 465/1072), al-Juwaynı¯ (d. 478/1085) and al-Fu¯rakı¯ (d.
478/1085).4 In post-Juwaynian Ash‘arism, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ (d. 505/1111) marks the beginning
of the transformation that culminates eventually in the rise of neo-Ash‘arism, which is
given its definitive formulation in the thought of al-Ra¯zı¯ (d. 606/1210).5 However, the
classical Ash‘arı¯ tradition continues, largely unaffected by al-Ghaza¯lı¯, until the third
quarter of the sixth/twelfth century, and is represented by several extant sources.6 These
include: the works of two of al-Juwaynı¯’s most important students of kala¯m, Abu¯ l-Qa¯sim
al-Ans·a¯rı¯ (d. 512/1118) and al-Kiya¯ al-Harra¯sı¯ (d. 504/1110);
7 a recently-discovered
summa by al-Ans·a¯rı¯’s student and Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯’s father D· iya¯’ al-Dı¯n al-Makkı¯ (d.
559/1163–64);8 what appears to be the earliest kala¯m work by al-Ra¯zı¯, which is based
4 We shall concentrate here on the mutakallimu¯n of the school, generally considered the chief
representatives of Ash‘arism, to the exclusion of more traditionalist figures such as al-Khat·t·a¯bı¯ (d.
388/998) and al-Bayhaqı¯ (d. 458/1066).
5 See: Ayman Shihadeh, “From al-Ghaza¯lı¯ to al-Ra¯zı¯: 6th/12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theology,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15.1 (2005): 141–79; and idem., “Ibn Ghayla¯n
al-Balkhı¯’s Criticism of the Materia Medica of Avicenna’s Canon of Medicine: An Episode of
Post-Ghaza¯lian Proto-Neo-Ash‘arism” (forthcoming). The designations “classical” and “neo-Ash‘arism”
correspond roughly to Ibn Khaldu¯n’s “earlier” (al-aqdamu¯n) and “later” Ash‘arı¯s (al-muta’akhkhiru¯n)
(al-Muqaddima, ed. ‘A. al-Shadda¯dı¯, 5 vols. [Casablanca: Bayt al-Funu¯n wa-l-‘Ulu¯m wa-l-A¯da¯b, 2005],
3, 33–6).
6 I discuss the development of late-fifth/eleventh- and sixth/twelfth-century, post-Juwaynian Ash‘arism
in more detail in a forthcoming publication.
7 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, al-Ghunya fı¯ l-kala¯m, MS Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III, 1916;
idem., Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, MS Princeton, University Library, Yahuda, 634 (an incomplete copy that does
not include the section on the spirit); Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aya
Sofia, 1205 (facsimile edition: intro. Hasan Ansari and Sabine Schmidtke [Berlin: Free University of
Berlin; Tehran: Mı¯ra¯th-i Maktu¯b, 2012]; I am grateful to Dr Ansari for supplying me with a copy of the
section on the spirit); al-Kiya¯ al-Harra¯sı¯, Us·u¯l al-dı¯n, MS Cairo, Da¯r al-Kutub al-Mis·riyya, 290 Kala¯m.
8 MS Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh Oriental Manuscript Library, Kala¯m 13 (previously housed at the
A¯s·afiyya Library); published as Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯’s Father, D· iya¯’ al-Dı¯n al-Makkı¯, Niha¯yat
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closely on al-Juwaynı¯’s Irsha¯d and Sha¯mil and perfectly representative of classical
Ash‘arı¯ theology;9 and an early commentary on al-Juwaynı¯’s Irsha¯d by the Andalusian
al-Faza¯rı¯ (d. Granada, 552/1157 or slightly later), which contains much material from
earlier Ash‘arı¯ sources, including al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s Hida¯ya, and is used here for the first
time.10 Al-Ra¯zı¯’s other extant works exhibit greater engagement with philosophical
theories and are hence unrepresentative of classical Ash‘arism. Using these first-hand,
classical Ash‘arı¯ sources, it has been possible to construct a fairly detailed account of the
theories propounded by their authors.
1. The Sources
The neglect of classical Ash‘arı¯ anthropology in contemporary scholarship is due
partly to the dearth of relevant material in the published primary sources. That the
subject, nevertheless, was afforded much attention in classical Ash‘arism is attested both
by the fact that leading school figures, as we shall see, devoted entire works to the
subject and in the substantial, including dedicated, discussions found in several extant
manuscript texts. These discussions fall under the following four categories.
First, man (insa¯n) is considered qua composite body (jism, jumla) in discussions on
general ontology, which appear in the lengthier summae, exemplified by al-Juwaynı¯’s
Sha¯mil, particularly in various places in discussions on atoms, accidents and causes (sg.
‘illa). Second, qua living being (h·ayy) predicated of various attributes associated with
living beings, man is central to treatments of divine attributes, which are analogised to
their human cognates. Of paramount relevance here are discussions on the properties
(ah· ka¯m) of the attribute of life (h·aya¯t), best illustrated in the lengthy chapter devoted to
this subject in al-Baghda¯dı¯’s Tafsı¯r asma¯’ Alla¯h.11
Third, aside from these physical and metaphysical discussions, treatments of the
“reality of man” (h·aqı¯qat al-insa¯n) can be found in the more extensive summae.
Focusing specifically on the ontology of man, these investigate the relation between the
human body and the attributes that define the obligated agent (al-mukallaf ). The
following are the sources known to contain dedicated discussions, including non-extant
ones:
al-mara¯m fı¯ dira¯yat al-kala¯m: Facsimile of the Autograph Manuscript of Vol. II, intro. Ayman Shihadeh
(Berlin: Free University of Berlin; Tehran: Mı¯ra¯th-i Maktu¯b, 2012). On the author, see the introduction.
The Niha¯ya is based closely on al-Ans·a¯rı¯’s Ghunya.
9 Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯, Us·u¯l al-dı¯n, MS Beirut, American University of Beirut Library, 297:R27kA. On this
text, see: Ayman Shihadeh, “Al-Ra¯zı¯’s Earliest Kala¯m Work,” forthcoming in Theological Rationalism in
Medieval Islam: New Sources and Perspectives, ed. G. Schwarb and L. Muehlethaler (Peeters: Leuven,
2012). The work was previously cited in: idem., The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯ (Leiden
and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2006), 7.
10
‘Alı¯ ibn Muh· ammad al-Faza¯rı¯, Manhaj al-sada¯d fı¯ sharh· al-Irsha¯d, MS London, British Library, OR.
9645. On this source, see the Appendix at the end of this article.
11
‘Abd al-Qa¯hir al-Baghda¯dı¯, Tafsı¯r asma¯’ Alla¯h al-h·usna¯, MS London, British Library, OR. 7547, f. 121b
ff.
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1. Ibn Fu¯rak’s conspectus of al-Ash‘arı¯’s teachings, the Mujarrad (pp. 215–18).12
2. Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s Kita¯b al-Insa¯n, cited by al-Ans·a¯rı¯. Considering the manner in which the
latter refers to the title, this appears to be a dedicated book, rather than a part of a larger
work. The first chapter is reportedly entitled, “On the properties of life, the characteri-
sation of the obligated agent, what he is, and related matters” (al-qawl fı¯ ah· ka¯m al-h· aya¯t
wa-s·ifat al-mukallaf wa-man huwa wa-ma¯ yattas·ilu bi-dha¯lika).
13
3. Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s major theological summa Hida¯yat al-mustarshidı¯n reportedly contained a
chapter, now lost, on the “obligated agent” (Kita¯b al-mukallaf ), in which the author
discusses the reality of man “at length”.14
4. Al-Juwaynı¯ refers several times in the Sha¯mil to a chapter either on man and spirit (ba¯b
al-insa¯n wa-l-ru¯h· wa-ma‘na¯-huma¯), or on man (kita¯b or ba¯b al-insa¯n), which would
have been located in the second half of the book, now lost.15 In the beginning of the part
on “justice and injustice” (al-ta‘dı¯l wa-l-tajwı¯r ) in the extant abridgement of the Sha¯mil,
he lists several topics that, it seems, he intends to treat in that part, including ma‘na¯
al-insa¯n wa-l-ru¯h· wa-l-nafs.
16 However, there is no trace of this chapter in the
abridgement; and al-Faza¯rı¯ confirms that despite these internal references, no such
chapter was actually included in the Sha¯mil.17 So either the chapter was never written, or
it was written but somehow failed to be transmitted.
5. Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya (ff. 154a–156b).
6. Al-Makkı¯, Niha¯yat al-mara¯m (ff. 84a–87b).
7. Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (ff. 103a–104b). The section on the spirit is appended with a
discussion on man, which has no counterpart in the Irsha¯d.
Fourth, several discussions of the spirit (al-ru¯h· ) are also found in both medium-sized
and long summae, which in most cases are concerned primarily with eschatology. The
following dedicated discussions are known:
12 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad maqa¯la¯t al-Shaykh Abı¯ l-H· asan al-Ash‘arı¯, ed. D. Gimaret (Beirut: Da¯r
al-Mashriq, 1987).
13 Cited in al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 154a; cf. al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 84a. I have not found any further
references to this work. It is not mentioned by al-Qa¯d· ı¯ ‘Iya¯d· (Tartı¯b al-mada¯rik wa-taqrı¯b al-masa¯lik,
eds. S. A. A‘ra¯b et al., 8 vols. [Rabat: Wiza¯rat al-Awqa¯f wa-l-Shu’u¯n al-Isla¯miyya, 1981–1983], 7, 69–70).
Earlier works dedicated to man— evidence of an established theological genre— are attributed to Abu¯
l-Hudhayl, al-Naz·z· a¯m, Abu¯ ‘Alı¯ al-Jubba¯’ ı¯ , Abu¯ Ha¯shim al-Jubba¯’ ı¯ , Abu¯ Sahl al-Nawbakhtı¯ and Abu¯
Muh· ammad al-Nawbakhtı¯ (see Gregor Schwarb, Handbook of Mu‘tazilite Authors, Works and Manu-
scripts [Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, forthcoming in 2013 or 2014]; I thank Dr Schwarb for these details).
14 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 103a (margin). On the extant fragments of the Hida¯ya, see Sabine
Schmidtke, “Early Ash‘arite Theology: Abu¯ Bakr al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ (d. 403/1013) and his Hida¯yat
al-mustarshidı¯n,” Bulletin d’Études Orientales 60 (2011): 39–71; Daniel Gimaret, “Un extrait de la
Hida¯ya d’Abu¯ Bakr al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯: Le Kita¯b at-tawallud, réfutation de la thèse mu‘tazilite de la génération
des actes,” Bulletin d’Études Orientales 58 (2009): 259-313.
15 Al-Juwaynı¯, al-Sha¯mil fı¯ us·u¯l al-dı¯n, eds. ‘A. al-Nashsha¯r et al. (Alexandria: Munsha’at al-Ma‘a¯rif,
1969), 668; 669; idem. (abridgement by a certain Ibn al-Amı¯r), al-Ka¯mil fı¯ ikhtis·a¯r al-Sha¯mil, MS
Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III, 1322, ff. 125b; 126a; 137a. The latter text was
recently published in a very poor edition, which will not be cited here (ed. J. ‘Abd al-Mun‘im, 2 vols.
[Cairo: Da¯r al-Sala¯m, 2010]).
16 Al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, f. 224b.
17 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 103a.
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1. Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, on the spirit and life (p. 257).
2. Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s Hida¯ya reportedly included a chapter on the spirit, now lost.18
3. Al-Qushayrı¯, Risa¯la (vol. 1, p. 205).19 The discussion on the spirit is guided by Sufi
concerns, but contains unmistakable Ash‘arı¯ elements.
4. Al-Juwaynı¯, Kita¯b al-Nafs. No copies are known of this major dedicated work, which,
according to the author, was approximately one thousand folios long.20
5. Al-Juwaynı¯, Irsha¯d (p. 377).21
6. Al-Mutawallı¯, Mughnı¯ (p. 57).22
7. Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya (ff. 217a–218a).
8. Al-Harra¯sı¯, Us·u¯l al-dı¯n (ff. 247b–248b).
9. Al-Makkı¯, Niha¯yat al-mara¯m (ff. 87b–90a).
10. Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (ff. 101b–103a).
11. Al-Ra¯zı¯, Us·u¯l al-dı¯n (ff. 178b–180a).
Recognising the close thematic affinity between discussions of man and spirit, some
sources treat them in adjoining sections. This can be seen in al-Makkı¯’s Niha¯yat
al-mara¯m and al-Faza¯rı¯’s Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, as well as al-Juwaynı¯’s planned chapter on
“man and spirit” in the Sha¯mil. As we shall see in the present article, though the
discussions may be juxtaposed, the extant sources never advance a fully coherent and
integrated theory.
2. The Definition of “Man” (al-insa¯n)
Like the Bas·ran Mu‘tazila, classical Ash‘arı¯s propounded an ontology that conceived
of the created world (al-‘a¯lam), defined as everything other than God, as consisting of
two primary types of entities: substances (jawa¯hir, sg. jawhar ) and accidents (a‘ra¯d· , sg.
‘arad· ). A substance is an indivisible, space-occupying atom (juz’) that is amenable to
receiving accidents, whereas an accident, for Ash‘arı¯s, is an entity that inheres in an atom
and constitutes an attribute (s·ifa) for it.
23 An individual atom or accident is said to be a
18 Cited in al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 102b (margin).
19
‘Abd al-Karı¯m al-Qushayrı¯, al-Risa¯lat al-Qushayriyya, ed. ‘A. Mah·mu¯d andM. al-Sharı¯f, 2 vols. (Cairo:
Da¯r al-Kutub al-H· adı¯tha, 1972).
20 Al-Juwaynı¯, al-‘Aqı¯dat al-Niz· a¯miyya, ed. M. al-Zubaydı¯ (Beirut: Da¯r Sabı¯l al-Rasha¯d and Da¯r
al-Nafa¯’is, 2003), 247 [the best critical edition of this work]; cf. al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, ff. 101b
(margin); 102b.
21 Abu¯ l-Ma‘a¯l ı¯ al-Juwaynı¯, Kita¯b al-Irsha¯d, ed. M. Mu¯sa¯ and ‘A. ‘Abd al-H· amı¯d (Cairo: Maktabat
al-Kha¯njı¯, 1950).
22 Al-Mutawallı¯, al-Mughnı¯, ed. M. Bernand, Supplément aux Annales islamologiques 11 (1986).
23 Al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 142–3; 165; 167–8. On Ash‘arı¯ atomism, see Abdelhamid Sabra, “Kala¯m Atomism
as an Alternative Philosophy to Hellenizing Falsafa,” in Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the
Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of RichardM. Frank, ed. J. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2006),
199–272; Richard M. Frank, “The Aš‘arite Ontology: I Primary Entities,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy
9 (1999): 163–231; idem., “Bodies and Atoms: The Ash‘arite Analysis,” in Islamic Theology and
Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed. M. Marmura (New York: State University of New
York Press, 1984), 39–53 and 287–293.
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“thing” (shay’), or an “entity” (dha¯t), a term whose referent must both exist and, strictly
speaking, be one (wa¯h· id) and indivisible: a monad.
24
A body (jism) is an aggregate, a composite (jumla), of atoms that adhere to each
other by means of the accident of composition (ta’lı¯f ), an instance of which inheres in
each atom in the body. Hence, a body, properly speaking, is not a single entity, but a
multiplicity of things. The arrangement of the atoms determines the structure (binya or
bunya), both internal and external, of the body, while the accidents that inhere in its
atoms determine its other attributes, for instance, colour, smell and temperature. An
object such as a tree, accordingly, will be a composite of numerous atoms conjoined to
form a particular structure, each possessed of a range of accidents, such that some parts
are green and moist, and others brown and dry. Yet it will not have an essence of
“treeness” that would make it a unified entity. Al-Baghda¯dı¯ hence writes in the section
on the “forming (tas·wı¯r ) of animate beings” that it is God “who forms (yus·awwir ) the
foetus in the womb, without assistance from any other being, and without a nature
(t·abı¯ ‘a) that causes (tu¯jib) that form in the foetus”.
25
In the absence of a unifying essence, no composite body could have a real definition
in the Aristotelian sense, which would delineate what a thing is in terms of its genus and
differentia, and thereby how it relates to other beings. Bodily objects can only be given
nominal definitions, which are intended to discriminate (tamyı¯z) them from other
beings.
This discrimination is achieved by the definition of “man”, different versions of
which are transmitted in the extant sources. The earliest is attributed to al-Ash‘arı¯, who
reportedly held that the referent (ma‘na¯) and definition (h·add) of “man” is “this visible
body that is composed in this manner of composition and structured in this type of
specific structure” (ha¯dha¯ l-jasad al-z· a¯hir al-murakkab bi-ha¯dha¯ l-tarkı¯b al-mabnı¯
bi-ha¯dha¯ l-d· arb min al-binyat al-makhs·u¯s·a). “Man”, hence, refers to “this composite”
(ha¯dhihi l-jumla), with which we are familiar, just as “palm” refers to a tree that has the
familiar tree form (hay’a) particular to it.26 This definition is borrowed from the Bas·ran
Mu‘tazila and can be traced back to Abu¯ l-Hudhayl al-‘Alla¯f (d. between 226/840 and
236/850).27 Classical Ash‘arı¯s often acknowledge that they share it with the “majority”
(al-dahma¯’) of the Mu‘tazila.28
24 For instance: al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l al-dı¯n (Istanbul: Madrasat al-Ila¯hiyya¯t bi-Da¯r al-Funu¯n al-Turkiyya,
1928), 35; al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 124 ff.; 346–7; cf. Frank, “The Aš‘arite Ontology,” 164–77, esp. 169.
Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ (al-Ins·a¯f fı¯-ma¯ yajibu i ‘tiqa¯du-hu wa-la¯ yaju¯zu al-jahl bi-hi, ed. M. Z. al-Kawtharı¯ [Cairo:
Mu’assasat al-Kha¯njı¯, 1963], 31) writes that “composition (ta’lı¯f ) can only involve two or more things
(shay’ayn)”, that is, two or more simple entities. On the definition of “one”, see Gimaret, Les noms
divins en Islam (Paris: Cerf, 1988), 191 ff.
25 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 234a.
26 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 215.
27 For instance: al-Ash‘arı¯, Maqa¯la¯t al-Isla¯miyyı¯n wa-ikhtila¯f al-mus·allı¯n, ed. H. Ritter (Wiesbaden:
Franz Steiner, 1980), 329; van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 3, 245–6; Heemskerk, “‘Abd al-Jabba¯r,”
129 ff.
28 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155b; cf. Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 215; al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 103a.
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A slightly different version of the same definition is given by al-Harra¯sı¯, who writes
that “man” is “this erect structure (ha¯dha¯ l-haykal al-qa¯’im) that we observe, [which
consists] of body and accidents”.29 For al-Ans·a¯rı¯, the “reality (h·aqı¯qa) of man” is “this
composite (jumla) that consists of multiple parts (dha¯t al-ab‘a¯d· )”, and adds:
If we are asked, “What is your definition of ‘man’?”, we say: [“Man” is] that which
has this specific structure by which he is distinct from the structures of cattle,
horses, palm trees and the like. Every man has this form (s·u¯ra) and structure; and
all that has this form and structure is a man.30
Paraphrasing al-Ans·a¯rı¯, his student al-Makkı¯ explains that the definition employs
self-evident concepts:
If it is said, “What is your definition of ‘man’?”, we say: [Man is] that which has
the specific external and internal structure (al-binyat al-makhs·u¯s·a z· a¯hiran
wa-ba¯t·inan) by which he is distinct from the structures of cattle, palm trees and the
like. This is a sensible object (amr mah· su¯s). Sensible and visible objects are
patently evident (al-mah· su¯sa¯t al-musha¯hada¯t wa¯d· ih· a¯t); and it is futile to seek to
make evident what is already patently evident!31
In other words, since the referent of “this specific structure” is known by means of
sensory, particularly visual perception, which consequently gives rise to an item of
immediate knowledge (‘ilm d·aru¯rı¯), it would be pointless, for the purposes of the
definition, to attempt to explicate the meaning of this phrase in any detail, for instance,
by providing a descriptive account of human anatomy.32 We shall return shortly to the
significance of al-Makkı¯’s reference to “external and internal structure”.
That this definition of “man” effects the discrimination of the object defined from all
other objects is emphasised by al-Faza¯rı¯, who confirms that the definition was held
unanimously by all Ash‘arı¯s:
What all our school authorities are unanimous on, both the earlier and later ones,
is that “man” is this A¯damic figure (shakhs·) that has this structure by which it is
differentiated from everything else. Hence, our saying “man” effects a distinction
(tamayyuz) between it and all other classes of animate beings (h·ayawa¯na¯t),
including angels, jinn and the like. They say the same concerning all other classes
of animate beings: so “elephant” is that being that has the structure familiar [to us],
and the same goes for horses.33
Nonetheless, although the definition is presented as effectively differentiating man from
other bodily objects, especially plants and animate beings, this is not the chief task it is
29 Al-Harra¯sı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 248b.
30 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, ff. 155b; 156a.
31 Al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 87b.
32 On sensory knowledge being a sub-division of immediate knowledge, see, for instance, al-Baghda¯dı¯,
Us·u¯l, 8–9.
33 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 103a.
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intended to serve, but in fact merely a condition that the definition is expected to satisfy.
For the principal objective of the definition, evident from the discussions in which it is set
out and invoked, is not to explain how man fits within a general cosmological and
zoological framework, but instead to circumscribe the concept “man” set against the
backdrop of a number of other competing configurations proposed in earlier kala¯m
works, which are either narrower (for instance, that it includes only some atoms located
in the heart), or broader (for instance, that it includes the combination of body and soul).34
The objective that this demarcation of the concept’s boundaries served was to define the
subject of obligation (mukallaf ), which revelation addresses and about which it makes
numerous statements: is it the whole body, something within the body, something
without the body, or some combination of bodily and non-bodily components?
To ascertain the definition of “man”, theologians appealed to the sense in which the
expression is normally used by the speakers of the language, particularly the pre-Islamic
Arabic that the Qur’a¯n uses, for which the expert and well-informed opinions of the
lexicographers (ahl al-lugha) are frequently cited as corroborating evidence. According
to al-Ash‘arı¯, when asked, “What is man?”, lexicographers simply point (asha¯ra) to the
body.35 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯ writes:
The majority of the lexicographers accept [our foregoing definition of man]. It is
furthermore attested by unambiguous occurrences (nus·u¯s·) in the Qur’a¯n and by
the consensus of scholars. The Arabs’ assertion in reference (isha¯ra) to the visible
body, “This is a man” — considering both the widely-known fact that they did so
and our knowledge of their intended [referent] — is equivalent to their assertion
with respect to “horse”, “house” and “palm tree”, “This is a palm tree”, “This is a
horse”, and “This is a mosque” [sic.]. The [Muslim] community, before the time of
al-Naz·z· a¯m and Mu‘ammar, was unanimous on that man is perceptible to the eye.
God, exalted, says, “We created man of a sperm-drop, a mingling, to test him”
[Q. 76.2].36
He then cites further Qur’a¯nic evidence attesting to the definition of “man” as the whole
bodily composite (23.12–13; 15.26; 82.6; 80.17–21). Al-Faza¯rı¯ justifies the appeal to
traditional and lexical evidence, to the exclusion of rational evidence in defining “man”:
The evidence for what we and all our school authorities have maintained is that
reason has no access to [the referents of] names (tasmiya¯t); for these can only be
gleaned from lexicon (lugha) and revelation (shar‘). Accordingly, since the Arabs
never use the expression “man” for one part of [the human body], its senses, its life,
its soul, nor any of these [sic.], but assigned (awqafa) it to this composite that we
34 On competing conceptions of man advanced in earlier Mu‘tazilism, particularly by Mu‘ammar ibn
‘Abba¯d (d. 215/830) and al-Naz·z· a¯m (d. 230/845), see: van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 3, 83 ff.; 3,
369 ff.; 4, 513 ff.; Hans Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische. System des Mu‘ammar ibn ‘Abba¯d
as-Sulamı¯ (Beirut: Franz Steiner, 1975), 339–411.
35 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 215.
36 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 156a.
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can point to (musha¯r ilay-ha¯), if an Arab says, “I saw”, or “I met”, or “I spoke with
a man (insa¯n)”, he will be referring to this visible composite.37
He too then cites representative Qur’a¯nic evidence (80.17; 84.7; 23.12) before arguing
that “man” denotes the bodily composite in a literal sense (h·aqı¯qa), rather than
figuratively (tajawwuzan), as supporters of competing definitions would claim. For had
the expression had a different literal meaning, this surely would have been acknowl-
edged by the lexicographers and attested in reports of authentic usage among the
Arabs.38
The reasoning that underlies the evidence adduced is this. “Man” in ordinary Arabic
denotes the body. God, the Lawgiver, is entitled to redefine this expression for the
purposes of His revealed religion, as He does with numerous other expressions. More
specifically, in the theological voluntarism of classical-Ash‘arism, God is even entitled to
redefine expressions that have ethical, soteriological and eschatological implications,
such as “man”. If He were to redefine an expression, it would retain its lexical (lughawı¯)
sense or senses and would acquire a new, “religious” (shar‘ı¯) sense. In other cases, even
when an expression is not redefined by God, the theologian may argue that an
expression ought to be redefined on rational grounds, in which case the lexical sense
may be deemed “figurative” (maja¯z) and the new sense “literal” (h·aqı¯qa), or vice
versa.39 Yet in the case of “man”, the expression, it is argued, is not redefined by God, but
continues to be employed in its standard lexical sense, as various Qur’a¯nic verses attest.
Nor can the mind arrive at its own definition of “man” that either confirms, or diverges
from, the lexical sense, for instance by discerning an intrinsic essence of man. Therefore,
the theological sense of “man”, in classical Ash‘arism, is identical with its lexical sense.
Now, the definition of “man” by reference to the familiar form of the human body
succeeds in differentiating the object defined from all other bodily objects. A taxonomy
of these is provided by al-Baghda¯dı¯, who explains that bodies (sg. jism) are divided into
those that grow and those that do not grow. The former are subdivided into plants and
animate beings (h·ayawa¯n), which are further subdivided into those that are sensible to
us and those that are normally insensible to us, but which may become sensible in the
hereafter or in exceptional situations. The latter subdivision, that of insensible animate
beings, includes four classes (jins): angels, houris, jinn and demons.40 The former
subdivision, that of sensible animate beings, too includes four classes: animals that walk
on legs, animals that fly (e.g. carnivorous and herbivorous birds, and flying insects),
animals that swim, and animals that crawl (e.g. snakes, scorpions, worms and crawling
37 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 103b.
38 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, ff. 103b–104a.
39 An example is the expression “living” (h·ayy), to be discussed below, p. 449 ff.
40 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 38–9; cf. idem, al-Farq bayna l-firaq, ed. M. Badr (Cairo: Mat·ba‘at al-Ma‘a¯rif, 1910),
316. In Asma¯’ (ff. 123a–b), he divides insensible animate beings (ah· ya¯’) (here, not a subclass of bodies)
into two types. The first is God, who is unique in being an animate being that never dies or changes.
The second includes three classes: angels, jinn and demons.
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insects). Animals that walk are further divided into human beings, herbivorous
(baha¯’im) and carnivorous (siba¯‘) animals that walk, and insects that walk. Al-Baghda¯dı¯
considers the humanoid Gog and Magog (Ya’ju¯j wa-Ma’ju¯j) human, but mentions others
who consider these creatures baha¯’im, and as such religiously permissible to consume.41
Note that the primary fourfold division of sensible animals according to their manner of
mobility is Qur’a¯nically-inspired (cf. 24.45; 6.38), and appeals to external parts and
structural features of animal bodies, for instance wings in the case of flying animals. This
forces the author to exclude certain winged creatures from being classed as flying
animals: namely, flying beetles (classed as walking animals), angels (cf. Q. 35.1), and the
Prophet’s cousin Ja‘far al-T· ayya¯r.
42 Al-Baghda¯dı¯ offers this taxonomy as an alternative to
that of the philosophers.43 Aristotle, by contrast, groups animals into genera and species
according to more physiological criteria.44
Nonetheless, as the Mu‘tazila had realised, there are complications that suggest that,
being based on the mere superficial appearance of the object defined, the definition
neither applies to all human beings nor adequately excludes all these other classes of
beings, just mentioned. For it can be objected that conceiving of “man” as “this familiar
form” (al-s·u¯rat al-ma‘hu¯da) implies that when a non-human living being, particularly an
angel or a jinn, takes human shape, it would be properly human, rather than an angel or
a jinn in disguise, and that a stone or wooden sculpture of a man would be literally a
man.45 The foremost examples of this are the cases of Gabriel who is said to have visited
the Prophet in the shape of a companion, Dih· ya al-Kalbı¯, and the angel who appeared
to Mary “in the shape of a perfect man” ( fa-tamaththala la-ha¯ basharan sawiyyan, Q.
19.17). Likewise, the humans whom, according to the Qur’a¯n, God transforms into pigs
and apes would completely cease to be human (2.65; 7.166).
Al-Ans·a¯rı¯ transmits two contrasting positions upheld by his fellow Ash‘arı¯s concern-
ing this problem. The majority define “man” as the being that has this familiar external
form (al-s·u¯rat al-z· a¯hira), in which case an anthropomorphic angel or wooden sculpture
41 On Gog and Magog, see: Emeri van Donzel and Andrea Schmidt,Gog and Magog in Early Syriac and
Islamic Sources (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2009), 65 ff.; 88 ff.; “Ya’dju¯dj wa-Ma’dju¯dj,” EI2; “Gog and
Magog,” Encyclopaedia of the Qur’a¯n.
42 “Flying Ja‘far”, or “Two-winged Ja‘far” (dhu¯ l-jana¯h· ayn), on whom, see “Dja‘far b. Abı¯ T· a¯lib,” EI2.
43 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 38–9; idem., Asma¯’, ff. 123a–b; cf. idem., Farq, 316.
44 On this, see: Pierre Pellegrin, La classification des animaux chez Aristote: Statut de la biologie et unité
de l’aristotélisme (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982).
45 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 156b; cf. al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 104a. To illustrate the manner in which
the angel’s transformation was understood, we could consider al-Juwaynı¯’s response to the following
query sent to him by ‘Abd al-H· aqq al-S· iqillı¯ (d. Alexandria, 466/1073), whom he met in Mecca in
450/1058 (Ajwibat Ima¯m al-H· aramayn al-Juwaynı¯ ‘an as’ilat al-Ima¯m ‘Abd al-H· aqq al-S·iqillı¯, ed. J. ‘A.
al-Jiha¯nı¯ [Amman: Da¯r al-Ra¯zı¯, 2007], 60–3). According to some h· adı¯ths, the size of Gabriel’s body is
huge; so when he appears to the Prophet in human form (tamaththul ), are the surplus atoms of his
body left behind in another place, or are they annihilated by God? Al-Juwaynı¯ accepts both possibilities,
but favours the latter. He rejects that Gabriel retains his shape but appears as a man only in the Prophet’s
imagination (takhyı¯l ), possibly a reference to Avicenna’s theory of prophecy.
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are each properly said to be “a man”. This indeed is the earliest school doctrine
advocated by al-Ash‘arı¯ who, according to Ibn Fu¯rak, maintained that humans trans-
formed into pigs and apes are no longer human and that an anthropomorphic Gabriel is
human.46 The other school position defines “man” as the being that has “this external and
internal form and structure” (ha¯dhihi l-s·u¯ra wa-l-binyat al-z· a¯hira wa-l-ba¯t·ina). Accord-
ingly, anthropomorphic angels, wooden sculptures and other simulacra would be
non-human; “for man contains a heart, life, senses, a chest cavity, bones, ribs, a liver, and
all the organs involved in nutrition, while the sculpture has none of that”.47 This, as we
have seen, is the position favoured by al-Makkı¯, and is also defended much earlier by
al-Kala¯ba¯dhı¯ (d. 380/990 or later).48
3. The Animate Being’s Attributes (s· ifa¯t al-h· ayy)
As we have seen, each class of living beings is distinct from other classes by the
specific and uniform configuration of its bodily structure and form. The structure
depends on the arrangement of the body’s constituent atoms, which is determined by the
accidents of location (akwa¯n) that inhere in each atom. The further attributes that
contribute to the external and internal form are explained by colour and probably other
accidents such as moistness, dryness, softness and coarseness. It is the combination of
the configuration of the atoms and these accidents that accounts for the four legs, head,
tail, two eyes, heart, muscles, black and white stripes, etc. of, say, a zebra, and that,
considering their uniformity and familiarity, alone justify referring to a particular object
as “a zebra”. As nothing other than the structure and the form enter into the definition of
“zebra”, even a dead zebra is still properly a “zebra”. Likewise, a dead human being is
still properly designated “man”.49
None of these visible features, however, account for the basic distinction that
al-Baghda¯dı¯ makes between animate and inanimate bodily objects in his foregoing
taxonomy. This distinction is instead analysed in terms of special attributes that are
46 Ibn Fu¯rak,Mujarrad, 215. Al-Ash‘arı¯’s position is also reported by al-Faza¯rı¯ (Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 104a).
47 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 104a; cf. al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 156b; al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 87b. The
Bas·ran Mu‘tazila, by contrast, do not seem to include “internal form” as such in their definition of “man”,
though some clarify the definition by stating that the bodily structure must comprise flesh, moisture and
life. According to Ibn Mattawayh (al-Tadhkira fı¯ ah· ka¯m al-jawa¯hir wa-l-a‘ra¯d· , ed. D. Gimaret, 2 vols.
[Cairo: Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 2009], 2, 371–2), al-Jubba¯’ ı¯ did not account for the
latter elements in his definition, but his son Abu¯ Ha¯shim did and hence maintained that “man” could
not designate an anthropomorphic sculpture. ‘Abd al-Jabba¯r, however, cites al-Jubba¯’ ı¯ opining that it is
unlikely (yab‘ud) that a sculpture can be designated “a man”, since it does not consist of flesh and blood
(al-Mughnı¯ fı¯ abwa¯b al-tawh· ı¯d wa-l-‘adl, 11. al-Taklı¯f, ed. M. ‘A. al-Najja¯r and ‘A. al-Najja¯r [Cairo: al-Da¯r
al-Mis·riyya li-l-Ta’l ı¯f wa-l-Tarjama, 1965], 312).
48 Al-Kala¯ba¯dhı¯, Bah· r al-fawa¯’id, ed. W. K. Zakı¯, 2 vols. (Cairo: Da¯r al-Sala¯m, 2008), 1, 543 ff., esp.
547–8 (partially cited in al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 104a). Al-Kala¯ba¯dhı¯’s discussion exhibits
non-kala¯m influences that go beyond our present scope.
49 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 156b. This agrees with the Bahshamı¯ position (‘Abd al-Jabba¯r, Mughnı¯, 11,
364).
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categorically specific to animate beings (sg. h·ayy, h·ayawa¯n) to the exclusion of
inanimate beings (sg. jama¯d), which are known as the “animate being’s attributes” (s·ifa¯t
al-h· ayy).
50 In the case of living bodily objects, each attribute (s·ifa) is accounted for, in
modular fashion, by a distinct accident that inheres in the atom and acts as a cause that
effects its particular properties (ah· ka¯m).
Of these attributes specific to animate being, the most primary is the attribute of life
(h·aya¯t), which is homogenous in all created animate beings — humans, angels, jinn,
demons and animals alike — that is to say, all instances of the accident of life belong to
one and the same class (jins wa¯h· id).
51 “Life”, according to al-Baghda¯dı¯, is defined by
Ash‘arı¯s in two main ways. Some define it as “an attribute by which the living being is
living”. In other words, it is a specific entitative determinant (ma‘na¯) that makes the being
to which it is particular a living being. Other members of the school define “life” as,
. . . an attribute that, by the existence of which, [it becomes possible that]
knowledge, capacity and will exist in that to which it [is an attribute of] life. If each
one of these attributes is used separately [in the definition]— such that we say, “life
is what acts as a condition (shart·) for the existence of capacity”, or “what is a
condition for the existence of knowledge”, or “what is a condition for the existence
of will” — the definition will still be correct. This is sound according to our
principles, since our school-members agree unanimously that the existence of
neither knowledge, capacity nor will would be possible (la¯ yas·ih· h·u) in what is not
living.52
In this vein, Ibn Fu¯rak defines life as “that by the existence of which the perception of
the objects of perception becomes possible”.53 This definition invokes the central
characteristic property of life, namely that it effects, in the entity in which it inheres, the
possibility (s·ih· h· a) of the existence of the other attributes specific to animate beings. Life,
hence, is a condition (shart·, mus·ah·h· ih· ) the existence of which the existence of each of
these other attributes depends (yaftaqiru) on, or requires (yaqtad· ı¯), and by which it
becomes possible (yas·ih· h·u).
54 It “is a condition for knowledge, will, capacity, their
particular contraries (a¯d· da¯di-ha¯ al-kha¯s·s·a) and every other attribute (was·f ) of which
only a living being can be attributed”.55 It is also a condition for perception, including
50 For instance, Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 68; 86; al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 15b.
51 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 105. This contrasts with, say, the accidents of colour and taste, which comprise
heterogeneous classes.
52 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 123b; cf. f. 203b.
53 Ibn Fu¯rak, al-H· udu¯d fı¯ l-us·u¯l, ed. M. Abdel Haleem, in “Early Islamic Theological and Juristic
Terminology: Kita¯b al-H· udu¯d fı¯ l-Us·u¯l by Ibn Fu¯rak,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies 54.1 (1991): 4–41, at 23.
54 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 260; al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 28–9; 105; idem., Farq, 325; al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 672;
708–11; al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 51a; idem., Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (MS Princeton), f. 50a. On that the terms
“shart· ” and “mus·ah·h· ih· ” are identical, see al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 710.
55 Al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 711. In contrast, say, to erroneous conviction (jahl ), death is a “general contrary”,
but not a “particular contrary”, to each of knowledge, will and capacity (al-Juwaynı¯ [Ibn al-Amı¯r],
Ikhtis·a¯r, ff. 60a–b). The existence of death, hence, is not conditional upon the coexistence of life.
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sight and hearing, and for pleasure and pain.56 Al-Juwaynı¯ refers to all these as “attributes
conditional upon life” (al-s·ifa¯t al-mashru¯t·a bi-l-h· aya¯t).
57 Opinions differed on whether
speech depended on life.58
Underlining the notion that life is the most primary of the attributes specific to
animate beings, al-Ra¯zı¯ writes that,
. . . a being that is capable and knowing must invariably be living. For predicating
(was·f ) it as “living” is more general, given that there is many a being that is living
but neither knowing nor capable. Restricted attributes (sg. was·f kha¯s·s·) cannot be
predicated [of a thing] unless the general attribute (was·f ‘a¯mm) is affirmed.
59
Life is the “general” attribute that encompasses absolutely all animate beings. The other
attributes specific to animate beings are “restricted” in the sense that not all animate
beings possess them.
Ash‘arı¯s often contrast this doctrine with the positions of both the earlier Mu‘tazilı¯
al-S· a¯lih· ı¯ (fl. late 3rd/9th c.), who maintained that attributes such as perception,
knowledge, capacity, will, hearing, sight, pleasure and pain did not depend on the
existence of life, but could exist in a dead object, and the Karra¯miyya who define life as
capacity and opine that though a human being loses his capacity when he dies he
continues both to perceive and to know. They were also aware that they shared this
doctrine with most Mu‘tazila, but with one important qualification: for Ash‘arı¯s, though
life is a condition for other attributes, it never causes, or necessitates, (awjabat,
aththarat) them.60 Al-Juwaynı¯, for instance, criticises the Bahshamı¯ doctrine that the
presence of the attribute of life and the absence of bodily defects in an object necessitate
(mu¯jib) perception.61 Likewise, knowledge is not necessitated by life; for there can be
life without knowledge.62 Philosophical and medical theories (normally ascribed to the
so-called t·aba¯’i ‘iyyu¯n, or ahl al-t·aba¯’ı¯ ‘, “exponents of [the theory of] the four natures”:
heat, coldness, moisture and dryness) that explain the somatic and psychosomatic
functions of living entities in terms of causally-intertwined properties intrinsic to
substances are subjected to severe criticism.
56 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, ff. 126b–127a (section entitled, “on the entitative determinants for the existence
of which life is a condition”). Al-Baghda¯dı¯ reiterates that this doctrine is held unanimously by all
Ash‘arı¯s.
57 For instance, al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, ff. 61a; 137a.
58 For instance, al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, ff. 123b; 128a; 138a; cf. Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-Ash‘arı¯, 208.
59 Al-Ra¯zı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 43b.
60 For the Bahshamı¯ position, see: Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 2, 416; 2, 446; 2, 526; 2, 699. On al-S· a¯lih· ı¯,
see: al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, ff. 94a; 128a; cf. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 4, 138–40. On the
Karra¯mı¯ position, see: al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 29; idem., Asma¯’, f. 128a; al-Ra¯zı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 43b.
61 Al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 688–9. The discussion appears in the chapter on causes (‘ilal ) and appeals to
more general doctrines on causes that go beyond the scope of the present paper. Cf. Ibn Mattawayh,
Tadhkira, 2, 699–700.
62 Al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 708–9; al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (MS Princeton), ff. 50a–b.
C A‘¯ A: B, L  S
445© 2012 Hartford Seminary.
The principle that life is a condition for the other attributes specific to animate beings
is typically argued for from the attributes of knowledge and capacity as follows. If we
reflect upon our observation of both beings that conceivably can be attributed (yas·ih· h·u
ittis·a¯fu-hu) by knowledge and capacity and beings that can be predicated of neither, we
will be able to discern, through the application of the method of “investigation and
disjunction” (al-sabr wa-l-taqsı¯m), that the only distinction that accounts for this
difference between these two classes of beings is the attribute of life present in the
former class but not in the latter.63 Life, hence, is a cause, or ground, (‘illa) that effects the
property (h·ukm) of making the existence of knowledge and capacity possible. From this
principle — a relatively-tangible item of knowledge relating to created things
(al-sha¯hid), whichmay serve to make known, by way of analogy (qiya¯s), intangible facts
about God (al-gha¯’ib) — Ash‘arı¯s go on to establish that since God can be shown to be
predicated of knowledge and capacity (He thus has the same h·ukm), it immediately
follows that He must be living (He has the same ‘illa).64 In the same vein, al-Baghda¯dı¯
argues that, given his denial that life is a condition for knowledge, capacity and will,
al-S· a¯lih· ı¯ will have no way of demonstrating that God is living.
65 Along the same lines, it
is then argued that since God is living, it will be conceivable for Him to have the
attributes of hearing and sight. Al-Ans·a¯rı¯ writes:
It has been shown that the living being in the observable realm (sha¯hidan) is
amenable to (qa¯bil li-) being predicated of hearing and vision. Having established
this, we then take the route of investigation and disjunction and say: An inanimate
being is not amenable to being predicated of hearing and sight; but if it becomes
predicated of life, it will become prepared (tahayya’a) to receive both [attributes],
if it does not bear a defect. If we then investigate the attributes of the living being
with a view to identifying what makes it amenable to being predicated of hearing
and sight, our investigation will illustrate that that can only be its being living. [. . .]
If we prove that God, exalted, is living, we must consequently assert that He is
predicated of hearing and sight.66
If, by contrast, the investigation results in that the condition for hearing and sight is
the sense organ (h· a¯ssa), it will become impossible to affirm that God hears or sees.
63 Al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 622. On investigation and disjunction, see, for instance: Josef van Ess, Die
Erkenntnislehre des ‘Ad·udaddı¯n al-I¯cı¯ (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1966), 394 ff.; Wael Hallaq, “The
Development of Logical Structure in Sunni Legal Theory”, Der Islam 64 (1987): 42–67, at 60–1; idem.,
“Logic, Formal Arguments and Formalization of Arguments in Sunnı¯ Jurisprudence”, Arabica 37 (1990):
315–58.
64 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 105; al-Juwaynı¯, Irsha¯d, 63; al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 51a; Abu¯ Bakr al-Fu¯rakı¯,
al-Niz· a¯mı¯ fı¯ l-us·u¯l (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2378), f. 41b. This is also, of
course, the standard Mu‘tazilı¯ proof that God is living (for instance, Mankdı¯m Shashdı¯w, Sharh· al-Us·u¯l
al-khamsa, ed. ‘A. ‘Uthma¯n [Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1965], 160 ff.).
65 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 95b; cf. idem., Us·u¯l, 105; idem., Farq, 325.
66 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 52b; cf. idem., Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (MS Princeton), f. 33b; al-Juwaynı¯, Irsha¯d, 73;
al-Mutawallı¯, Mughnı¯, 19–20.
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These stock arguments are encountered, in one form or another, in most kala¯m works in
which God’s attributes are argued for.
For classical Ash‘arı¯s, death is an accident and as such a direct contrary (d· idd) of
life.67 It is also a contrary of all other attributes of animate beings.68 This position is
defended against both the Bahshamı¯s and “some” philosophers whomaintain that death
is the mere privation of life (laysa ma‘nan akthar min ‘adam al-h· aya¯t). For the
philosophers, hence, death is analogous to both the state of rest (suku¯n) and darkness,
which they consider to be not things (laysa bi-shay’), but the mere privation of motion
and light, respectively. In response, al-Baghda¯dı¯ argues that this would entail the
inadmissible consequent that even accidents can properly be said to be “dead” and “in
a state of rest”, since they cannot receive the accidents of life or motion. Likewise,
al-Ans·a¯rı¯ argues that had “dead” referred to the mere privation (‘uruww) of life, it would
have been correct to describe all accidents and inanimate beings as “dead”.69 To
al-Makkı¯, the Qur’a¯nic statement that God “created life and death” (67.2) attests to death
being a “real existent” (mawju¯d h·aqı¯qı¯).
70
The doctrine that death is an accident has a basis in the classical Ash‘arı¯ principle that
an atom must contain an instance of each class (jins) of accidents or its contrary.71 There
was a difference of opinion as to whether death was the only contrary of life. Some
classical Ash‘arı¯s distinguish between death and inanimateness (jama¯diyya), and hence
treat life, death and inanimateness as direct contraries of each other.72 Al-Baghda¯dı¯ cites
the Qur’a¯nic verse, “Every nafs will taste death” (3.185), as evidence that only spirit
(nafs)-bearing beings die, to the exclusion of inanimate beings and accidents.73 For
al-Juwaynı¯, however, death exists in all non-living beings, including inanimate beings
that have not been, and will never be, animate, though it is uncustomary to describe
these as “dead”. Both the death present in the inanimate being that has never been
67 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 216; al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 43; al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, ff. 60a–b. The
meaning of the divine name “Mumı¯t” is “He who creates death in what He causes to die” (al-Baghda¯dı¯,
Asma¯’, f. 203a). Like the accident of life, death is homogenous (idem., Asma¯’, f. 204a). The distinct
accident of killing (qatl ) subsists in the killer, not the entity killed (idem., Us·u¯l, 43; on the earlier debate
on killing, see al-Ash‘arı¯, Maqa¯la¯t, 408; 421 ff.).
68 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 266; al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 203b.
69 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 43; idem., Asma¯’, ff. 203b–204a; al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 154b (reading allatı¯ la¯
h· aya¯t fı¯-ha¯ maws·u¯fa bi-anna-ha¯ mayyita; also paraphrased by al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 84b). For the
Bahshamı¯ position, see IbnMattawayh, Tadhkira, 2, 404 ff. In viewing death as an accident, the Ash‘arı¯s
were in agreement with the Baghda¯dı¯ Mu‘tazila (Abu¯ Rashı¯d al-Naysa¯bu¯rı¯, al-Masa¯’il fı¯ l-khila¯f bayna
l-bas·riyyı¯n wa-l-baghda¯diyyı¯n, ed. M. Ziya¯da and R. al-Sayyid [Tripoli, Libya: Ma‘had al-Inma¯’ al-‘Arabı¯,
1979], 235 ff.) and Abu¯ ‘Alı¯ al-Jubba¯’ ı¯ (Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 2, 404–5).
70 Al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 84b; cf. al-Ra¯zı¯, al-Tafsı¯r al-kabı¯r, 32 vols. in 16 (Beirut: Da¯r al-Fikr, 1981), 30,
54. The verse was also cited by al-Jubba¯’ ı¯ in support of this doctrine (Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 2, 406).
71 For instance, al-Harra¯sı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 41a.
72 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 43; idem., Asma¯’, f. 203b. He attributes this position simply to “our
school-members” (as·h· a¯bu-na¯).
73 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, ff. 204a–b. Ash‘arı¯ conceptions of the spirit are discussed below.
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animate (jama¯d) and that which occurs in a previously-living being (h·ayawa¯n) are
homogeneous.74
Yet even if it is distinguished from inanimateness, death need not be preceded by
life.75 Ash‘arı¯s often maintained that in its initial phases of formation, that is, when it
begins as sperm in the womb and during the earliest stage of its foetal development, the
human body is dead.When the spirit is then instilled in the foetus, when it is four-months
old, its atoms become endowed with the accident of life, which replaces the accident of
death. When the body then dies, the atoms once more receive the accident of death,
which replaces life; and when the body is resurrected life replaces death for the final
time. This explains the Qur’a¯nic verse, “Twice You have made us dead, and twice You
have brought us to life” (40.11).76
To say that a bodily object is “living” does not imply that instances of the accident of
life exist in all of its atoms. In unsound bodies, life may inhere in the atoms comprising
only someparts of the body,while deathwill inhere in atoms comprising other parts.77 Yet
even sound bodies, according to most classical Ash‘arı¯s, are only partly animate.
Opinions differed on whether hair and bones were living: a debate that was of especial
interest to jurists, who sought to determine whether these substances were religiously
pure or impure.78 Onewidely-accepted criterion is that parts that cannot perceive pain are
inanimate, which rests on the principles that life is the only condition for the perception
of pain and that this class of perception is the only animate attribute, other than life, that
normally can occur in any living part of the body. Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯, and following him
al-Juwaynı¯, favoured the view that “hair bears no signs (dala¯’il ) of life”, most evidently as
it cannot be a locus for pain. Hair growth does not presuppose life; for plants too grow,
but are deemed to be inanimate. Bones were a more problematic case, as it was difficult
to ascertain whether or not they could experience pain. If it is asserted that they do
experience pain, then they will be living. Otherwise, if pain is experienced only in the
nerves that interpenetrate bones, that would suggest that bones are not living.79
74 Al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, f. 60b. Likewise, al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ (Ins·a¯f, 30) identifies both “lifeless
beings (mawa¯t) and accidents” as “inanimate beings (jama¯da¯t), which are devoid of life”, which
implies that he makes no distinction between death and inanimateness.
75 Ibn Fu¯rak, H· udu¯d, 23; al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, f. 60b.
76 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, ff. 203a; 234a. The Ma¯turı¯dı¯, Abu¯ Ish· a¯q Ibra¯hı¯m al-S·affa¯r (d. 534/1139) adduces,
“You were dead, then He gave you life” (Q. 2.28) (Talkhı¯s· al-adilla li-qawa¯‘id al-tawh· ı¯d, ed. A.
Brodersen, 2 vols. [Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2011], 1, 246–7).
77 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 29.
78 Al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, f. 60b; cf. f. 201b. For representative eleventh-century juristic
discussions of this question see: al-Juwaynı¯, Niha¯yat al-mat·lab fı¯ dira¯yat al-madhhab, ed. ‘A. M.
al-Dı¯b, 14 vols. (Beirut: Da¯r al-Minha¯j, 2007), 1, 30–1; 1, 36 (where al-Juwaynı¯ notes that this subject
belongs properly to lat·ı¯f al-kala¯m, that is, theological investigations of the nature of created beings, in
contrast to jalı¯l al-kala¯m, which is more concerned with divine and cosmic matters); and ‘Alı¯ ibn
Muh· ammad al-Ma¯wardı¯, al-H· a¯wı¯ al-kabı¯r, ed. M. Mast·arjı¯, 24 vols. (Beirut: Da¯r al-Fikr, 1994), 1, 73 ff.
79 The association made between life and pain is borrowed from the Bas·ran Mu‘tazila. See, for instance:
‘Abd al-Jabba¯r, Mughnı¯, 11, 311 ff.; 11, 335–7; cf. Heemskerk, “‘Abd al-Jabba¯r,” 132.
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Other accidents of animate beings normally occur in specific parts of the body.
Knowledge, for instance, normally occurs in the heart, which according to al-Juwaynı¯,
is confirmed by scriptural evidence: namely, several Qur’a¯nic verses that make the heart
central to man, especially as the locus of belief (e.g. 50.37), and “commands” (amr )
(probably not exclusively revealed) which associate evil thoughts and motives (wiswa¯s,
kha¯t·ir, ha¯jis) with the heart.
80 This cardiocentrism is defended against the physicians’
theory that knowledge occurs in the brain, for which they attest anatomical evidence.81
Yet al-Juwaynı¯ and, as he reports, most other Ash‘arı¯s also accept that it is conceivable
for knowledge to exist in other loci within the body. For when sensory perception,
which again can occur in any living part of the body, occurs in an atom, it will be
followed by an accident of knowledge that occurs in the same atom, which then
becomes both a “perceiver” (mudrik) and a “knower” (‘a¯lim). In the normal course of
events (‘a¯da), an instance of knowledge — whose content is that an instance of
perception has occurred in a certain part of the body — may subsequently occur in an
atom within the heart.82 A more detailed exploration of the properties and workings of
each of the attributes specific to the living being is beyond the scope of the present
article.
4. Bodily Structure (binya)
As mentioned earlier, a created “thing” (shay’), in both Bas·ran Mu‘tazilism and
Ash‘arism, can be either an atom or an accident.83 A composite body, strictly speaking,
is thus not a thing, but an agglomeration of multiple things, especially, as already pointed
out, that the whole would lack a unifying essence. In earlier (pre-Bahshamı¯ and
pre-Ash‘arı¯) Bas·ranMu‘tazilism, an instance of an accident can only qualify a single atom.
80 Al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, ff. 60b–61a; cf. f. 107a; al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯, Ins·a¯f, 52; al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya,
f. 86a. See also p. 461 ff. below. For a Bahshamı¯ view, see ‘Abd al-Jabba¯r,Mughnı¯, 11, 365; Heemskerk,
“‘Abd al-Jabba¯r,” 133.
81 Al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, ff. 60b–61a. However, in his later work the Niz· a¯miyya (246–7),
he writes in the section on the punishment in the grave that “the cognizant part (al-fa¯him) of man in
the present life consists of subtle particles located in (ajza¯’ lat·ı¯fa fı¯) either his heart or brain, whereas
the organs of action are employed (mustakhdam) by those cognizant and managing (mudabbir )
particles. The hand, leg, flesh, muscles and bones possess no knowledge themselves”. These “subtle
particles” seem to be certain atoms in, or probably of, the heart or the brain and should not be identified
with the spirit (cf. p. 470 ff. below), since al-Juwaynı¯ adds that the spirit will be “returned” to them in
the grave. In the Irsha¯d (376), the subject of the inquisition in the grave is said to be particles “of either
the heart or another” part of the body (mina l-qalb aw ghayri-hi), though these are not afforded any
cognitive role in the present life. Many of the views put forth in the Niz· a¯miyya, it should be added,
differ from al-Juwaynı¯’s earlier views and were shunned in early-6th/12th-century Ash‘arism. On
Galenic encephalocentrism, see, for instance: Julius Rocca,Galen on the Brain: Anatomical Knowledge
and Physiological Speculation in the Second Century AD (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2003).
82 Al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, ff. 60b–61a.
83 See p. 438 above.
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A bodily composite, therefore, would have no attributes that are particular to it as a
whole, but would be no more than the sum total of its constituent atoms and their
individual attributes.
To the Mu‘tazila, however, this model left some crucial questions unanswered. Chief
among those are ethical questions that revolve around the definition of the obligated
agent (mukallaf ). For man must be responsible for his acts, according to the Mu‘tazilı¯
theory of justice, as a single unity, not as individual atoms or organs. Knowledge and
motives, for instance, exist in the heart, but can result in an evil act that takes place in the
arm; yet another part or even the entire body might be justly punished either in this
world or in the afterlife. This shows that the true agent that bears full responsibility for
the act is the whole bodily composite, not just the arm or the heart. Abu¯ ‘Alı¯ al-Jubba¯’ ı¯
(d. 303/915), hence, maintained that the living being was somehow a unity, though it
appears that he lacked the ontological apparatus to explain exactly how knowledge and
action could be predicated of the whole composite, not just of the atoms of the heart or
a limb.84
The solution to this problem was proposed by his son Abu¯ Ha¯shim al-Jubba¯’ ı¯ (d.
321/933), who introduced the concept of the “state” (h· a¯l ) as an ontologically-real
attribute (s·ifa) that qualifies an entity.
85 To say that a corporeal thing is living (h·ayy)
hence denotes, not the presence in it of the accident of life, but “its being living”
(kawnu-hu h·ayyan), a state that the accident of life engenders.
86 Abu¯ Ha¯shim also
distinguished between accidents that qualified only the individual atom in which they
inhered, and accidents that engendered an attribute, or a state, for the whole composite
body. The latter class of accidents includes life and the accidents conditional upon it.87
And it is the composite body’s “being living”, by virtue of the accident of life that inheres
in most of its atoms, that makes the whole have “the character of a single thing” ( fı¯ h· ukm,
or bi-manzilat al-shay’ al-wa¯h· id), that is, a unity.
88 This unity allows the Bahshamı¯s to
speak of the individual man as being, strictly speaking, a single voluntary agent (murı¯d),
a knower (‘a¯lim) and a perceiver (mudrik).
However, the relation between the accidents specific to living beings and the
composite body as a whole is also one of mutual dependence. The very accidents that
engender an attribute for the whole composite body (jumla) that has a structure (binya)
specific to its class of animate beings also depend on this structure for their existence. A
sound bodily structure, and indeed the presence of moisture (rut·u¯ba, billa) in the body,
are each a condition (shart·) for the existence of life.
89 The inseparable connection
84 See Frank, Beings and their Attributes, 42.
85 On the Bahshamı¯ theory of states, see: Frank, Beings and their Attributes, 20 ff.; Ahmed Alami,
L’ontologie modale: Étude de la théorie des modes d’Abu¯ Ha¯šim al-Gˇubba¯’ı¯ (Paris: Vrin, 2001); “H· a¯l,”
EI2.
86 Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 2, 369–71; cf. Frank, Beings and their Attributes, 44–5.
87 Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 2, 411; 2, 524; 2, 697–8; cf. Frank, Beings and their Attributes, 45.
88 Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 2, 370; ‘Abd al-Jabba¯r, Mughnı¯, 11, 352.
89 Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 2, 383–6; ‘Abd al-Jabba¯r, Mughnı¯, 11, 354.
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between the two doctrines is indicated explicitly by the Bahshamı¯ Ibn Mattawayh, who
writes in the course of listing the various primary divisions of accidents, that accidents,
. . . that exist in a single substratum90 divide into those that require (iftaqara ila¯)
bodily structure, and those that do not. The former are all those that engender
(iqtad· a¯) an attribute for the composite body. The latter are all those that do not.
91
Elsewhere, he argues for the dependence of the existence of life on structure from the
doctrine that life qualifies the composite whole as a unity, as follows.92 If it is conceivable
for the accident of life to exist in a solitary atom, it would qualify that atom as living. If
further atoms are then joined to that atom, that instance of the accident of life would
continue to qualify that atom in which it subsists, and would not extend its effect to these
other atoms. Therefore, if each of these atoms had its own individual accident of life,
their sum total would be an agglomeration of multiple discrete living beings (ah· ya¯’).
However, we already know that the living being is a unity. From this, Ibn Mattawayh
infers that life cannot subsist in an individual atom, but requires the presence of a sound
bodily structure.
Both doctrines are opposed by classical Ash‘arı¯s, who argue against the possibility
of an inherent causative relation between the individual accident and the composite
body as a whole. This stance traditionally finds expression in two doctrines, the
antitheses of the Bahshamı¯ propositions:
A1. The existence of an accident specific to animate beings in an atom is not conditional
upon the atom being part of a bodily structure.
A2. An instance of an accident specific to animate beings only qualifies the atom in which
it inheres, never the whole bodily composite of which the atom is part.
Bodily structure, hence, is never a condition (shart·) for the existence of an accident,
which in turn is never a cause (‘illa) for any bodily attributes. Reflecting their adversaries’
position, Ash‘arı¯s too consider the two doctrines inseparable. From A2, it is then
contended:
A3. The individual human being is not a unity.
As a bodily composite, man is nothing more than the sum of its constituent atoms and
accidents. Let us consider A1 and A2 first, before turning (in section 4.2) to A3.
4.1. Accidents are Particular to Atoms, Never to Bodies
i. Al-Ash‘arı¯ and al-Qala¯nisı¯
Classical Ash‘arı¯s argue that life depends on neither specific bodily structure (binya
makhs·u¯s·a) nor moistness (billa, rut·u¯ba), but instead can inhere in any self-subsistent
90 As opposed to the accident of composition (ta’lı¯f ), which exists in two atoms.
91 Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 1, 2.
92 Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 2, 383.
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being, even in a solitary atom.93 The same is true of other animate attributes, which are
furthermore not conditional on the presence of bodily instruments (a¯la) or sense organs
(h· a¯ssa).
94 Ibn Fu¯rak reports that al-Ash‘arı¯,
. . . asserted that none of these entitative determinants [particular to animate
beings] requires a bodily structure, in contrast to our adversaries’ claim that life
requires a specific structure (for instance the structure of man or another animate
being), such that if the head becomes disconnected from the body the existence of
[life] would become impossible, just as [life] requires a substratum, in the absence
of which its existence would be impossible.
He also maintained that life can exist in a solitary atom (juz’ munfarid), that
separateness (iftira¯q) is not contrary to life, and that life can exist in any form of
composition (tarkı¯b) whatsoever. And he maintained that life does not require
moistness to exist.95
Readily discernible evidence attesting to this doctrine (A1), Ash‘arı¯s point out, can be
seen in that God can create life in things so small as a gnat or so big as an elephant, and
that various insects are possessed of life and perception despite lacking our human
bodily structure.96 As evidence that the soundness of bodily structure is unnecessary for
life, they cite, for instance, the cases of the snake that when cut into pieces continues to
move, the body of the decapitated person which purportedly convulses for a short while
following decapitation, and the severely-injured person who continues to live for a few
days despite having an unsound bodily structure.97 Notwithstanding, Ash‘arı¯s recognise
that, in the normal course of events (‘a¯da), life is negated when bodily structure becomes
defective just as it becomes negated in the absence of nourishment.98 In itself, however,
the normal courses of events (‘a¯da¯t) do not constitute sufficient evidence for life’s
dependence on structure, which instead should be shown to be either known
immediately (d·aru¯ra) or established discursively using proofs (naz·ar wa-istidla¯l ).
99
Apart from removing a constraint from God’s creative power and underpinning the
related doctrine that accidents cannot qualify composite bodies, the doctrine that
animate accidents do not require bodily structure is significant in broader Ash‘arı¯
theology in at least two further respects. It is appealed to in defence of the Ash‘arı¯
doctrine that the divine attributes of life, knowledge, capacity, sight and hearing are
entitative determinants and as such ontologically distinct fromGod’s essence, against the
93 For instance, Ibn Fu¯rak,Mujarrad, 170; 205; 266; al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 105; 28–9; idem., Asma¯’, f. 203b;
al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 154a.
94 For instance, al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, ff. 104b (speech); 125b–126a and 128a ff.
(perception); 142a–b (capacity).
95 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 266.
96 Al-Fu¯rakı¯, Niz· a¯mı¯, f. 128b; al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155a; cf. al-Mutawallı¯, Mughnı¯, 56. This, of course,
presupposes that life in all these creatures is homogenous.
97 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 30; al-Fu¯rakı¯, Niz· a¯mı¯, ff. 128a–b.
98 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 29–30.
99 Al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, f. 126a.
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Mu‘tazilı¯ criticism that had these been entitative determinants they would have required
a bodily structure in which to inhere, and in some cases they would have also been
conditional on the presence of bodily instruments or sense organs.100 The doctrine also
proved instrumental in discussions of the inquisition and torment experienced in the
grave by decomposed bodies or small bodily fragments. Classical Ash‘arı¯s argued that
since animate attributes are not dependent on sound bodily structure, God can create
life, knowledge, speech and other necessary attributes in some of the atoms of the body,
allowing this process to take place.101
The related doctrine (A2) that an accident can only qualify an atom, never a
composite body, and engender for it an attribute (s·ifa) can again be traced back to
al-Ash‘arı¯. He reportedly held that “living”, “perceiver”, “knower” and “capable” can only
designate, strictly speaking, the atom in which, respectively, life, perception, knowledge
and capacity inhere.102 This is implied when Ash‘arı¯s often state that “living” denotes
“that in which life inheres” (ma¯ qa¯mat bi-hi l-h· aya¯t); “acquirer” denotes “that in which
acquisition inheres”; and so forth.103 Al-Baghda¯dı¯ reports al-Ash‘arı¯’s position, accepted
across the school, as follows:
According to him, the one living, capable, knowing and willing, in this world
(al-sha¯hid), is the atom in which knowledge, volition, capacity and life subsist.
Composites cannot be predicated of (la¯ tastah· iqqu) these attributes (aws·a¯f ) by the
inherence of these attributes in parts thereof, just as a composite does not become
black or moving by the inherence of blackness andmotion in a part thereof. Rather,
it is the atom in which blackness andmotion subsist, to the exclusion of all adjacent
atoms, that will become black and moving by virtue of the blackness and motion
that subsist therein.104
When the designations derived (mushtaqq) from “life”, “knowledge” and other accidents
are predicated of a composite body, they are used in a figurative (maja¯z), rather than a
literal (h·aqı¯qa), sense. Even when life inheres in all of the atoms that constitute the
composite, al-Ash‘arı¯ would say that it is each individual atom, rather than the composite
as a whole, that is living.105
100 See, for instance: al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Iktis·a¯r, ff. 125b–126a (“Had the structure been a
condition for [perception], the Pre-eternal Being would not have been a perceiver; for conditions must
be applied equally at both the observable and unobservable levels [al-shuru¯t· yajibu t·ardu-ha¯ sha¯hidan
wa-gha¯’iban]”); al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (MS Princeton), ff. 66b–67a; idem., Ghunya, f. 154b. For the
Mu‘tazila, speech does not require structure (Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 1, 187 ff.), while will can exist
without inhering in a substratum.
101 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 170; al-Fu¯rakı¯, Niz· a¯mı¯, f. 127b; al-Ra¯zı¯, Us·u¯l, ff. 177a–178a; cf. the Ma¯turı¯dı¯
al-S·affa¯r, Talkhı¯s· al-adilla, 1, 248–50. The inquisition most likely occurs in some of the atoms of the
heart (al-Juwaynı¯, Irsha¯d, 376), or in either the heart or the brain (al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 216a).
102 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 263.
103 For instance, Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 108; 146; 205; 263; cf. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 124a.
104 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 36a.
105 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, ff. 127a; 129b.
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The defence of this doctrine is coupled with the criticism of the Mu‘tazilı¯ theory that
animate attributes are properly predicated of the whole composite of the human body.
According to Ibn Fu¯rak:
[Al-Ash‘arı¯] used to maintain that the doctrines, espoused by the Mu‘tazila, [1] that
man is this [external] composite, and [2] that it is this composite that acts and is
living and capable, prove to be weak when examined with respect to their own
principal doctrines (u¯s·u¯l ). [He maintained] also that the doctrine, espoused by
some of them, [3] that what is living and capable is the individual atom, is more
consistent and sounder when examined with respect to their principal doctrines.106
Al-Ash‘arı¯ reproduces objections against doctrines 1 and 2 put forth by Mu‘tazilı¯
exponents of doctrine 3, that man is an atom.107 He reportedly “used to judge in favour
of those who asserted that man is a single indivisible atom, against those Mu‘tazilı¯s who
held” doctrines 1 and 2,108 including, of course, his teacher al-Jubba¯’ ı¯ . This was only a
tactic to demonstrate that doctrines 1 and 2 are inconsistent. Dialectic aside, al-Ash‘arı¯
accepted doctrine 1 and opposed 2 and 3.
The main objection al-Ash‘arı¯ reproduces can be summarised as follows. If we
postulate a composite body, in which life inheres in some parts and death, the contrary
of life, inheres in other parts, then each of life and death will qualify the part (ba‘d· ),
the whole (al-kama¯l ), or neither the part nor the whole, in one of the following
configurations:
i. The whole is living, and the whole is dead. However, it is inconceivable for an object to
be qualified at once by contraries.
ii. The part in which death inheres is not dead (and either the whole, or the part in which
life inheres, is living). This, however, is inconceivable, as it would follow that the part in
which motion inheres is not moving.
iii. The part in which life inheres is living, and the part in which death inheres is dead. This
is al-Ash‘arı¯’s own position, which the Mu‘tazila eventually have to concede.
iv. The part in which life inheres is not living (and either the whole, or the part in which
death inheres, is dead). This, however, is inconceivable, as it would imply that although
the part in which incapacity (‘ajz), which is analogous to death, inheres becomes
incapable, the part in which capacity, which is analogous to life, inheres is not capable.
As evident from later Ash‘arı¯ versions of this argument from death against the doctrine
that an attribute can qualify the whole composite, the argument draws its force from the
notion that if the reality of death is conceded, it must have properties (ah· ka¯m) cognate
to those of life, its direct contrary. “According to us”, al-Ans·a¯rı¯ writes, “there is no
106 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 215.
107 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 215–17 (p. 216, ln. 3, reading al-jumla instead of al-juz’).
108 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 217. The text does not identify the exponents of doctrine 3. Elsewhere,
al-Ash‘arı¯ attributes this position to al-S· a¯lih· ı¯ (Maqa¯la¯t, 332; cf. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 4,
139–40).
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difference ( farq) between death and life, because they are contraries (d· idd)”.
109 If
conceded, such equivalence between the properties of death and life would force the
opponents to concede either i or iii.
Al-Ash‘arı¯’s objection from death targets Abu¯ ‘Alı¯ al-Jubba¯’ ı¯ and other earlier
Mu‘tazilı¯s who hold that death is a real entity. Later Ash‘arı¯ sources couple this objection
with arguments against the view of Abu¯ Ha¯shim, al-Ash‘arı¯’s contemporary, and his
followers that death is the mere privation of life and hence not an accident. These have
been discussed above.110
Aside from the Mu‘tazila, Ibn Fu¯rak transmits a comparatively amiable objection that
al-Ash‘arı¯ directs at some unnamed theologians with whom he associates himself
(as·h· a¯bu-na¯), who hold that “man”, or “the composite totality of man” (jumlat al-insa¯n),
“is capable”, “is living”, and “is the acquirer (muktasib)”. In contrast, he asserted that the
individual atom is in fact the object predicated of the attributes and hence the
designations “capable” and “living”, since capacity and life only inhere in the atom,
which consequently is the entity predicated of the designations “acquirer”, “obedient”
(mut·ı¯ ‘), “disobedient” (‘a¯s· ı¯), “object of reward” (mutha¯b) and “object of punishment”
(mu‘a¯qab).111 Al-Baghda¯dı¯ identifies these figures as Ibn Kulla¯b (d. 241/855), al-Qala¯nisı¯
(3rd/9th c.) “and their followers”, who designate the composite whole as the “wrong-
doer” (z· a¯lim), “knower” and “capable”, even though wrongdoing, knowledge and
capacity exist only in some parts of the body.112 Al-Qala¯nisı¯ is said to have maintained
that “the attributes derived from (al-was·f al-mushtaqq min) life, knowledge and
capacity” apply to the composite whole, though the accidents subsist only in parts
thereof.113
Although this position appears in the first instance to coincide with the Mu‘tazilı¯
thesis on the unity of man, al-Baghda¯dı¯ interprets it in accordance with the standard
Ash‘arı¯ position (A2 and A3). For in one place, he distinguishes between two positions
taken by “fellow theologians” (as·h· a¯bu-na¯), the first being al-Ash‘arı¯’s doctrine that
attributes (was·f ) such as life, knowledge and volition qualify only the atoms in which
they inhere, rather than composite bodies. In the second position, which is not attributed
here to any named figures, “the composite whole of man is one living [object] and one
knower” (h·ayy wa¯h· id ‘a¯lim wa¯h· id). Nonetheless,
These designations (ism) apply to the composite whole of man, not because of the
combination (ijtima¯‘) of its atoms, but because God, may He be exalted and
glorified, assigned (khas·s·a) them to it [that is, the composite whole], and applied
109 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 154b; paraphrased by al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 84b.
110 See above, p. 447–8. For a Bahshamı¯ response to the argument from death, see ‘Abd al-Jabba¯r,
Mughnı¯, 11, 355–6.
111 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 108; 134; 146; cf. Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-Ash‘arı¯, 96–7.
112 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 132; idem., Asma¯’, f. 170b. On Ibn Kulla¯b, see van Ess, Theologie und
Gesellschaft, 4, 180 ff. On al-Qala¯nisı¯, see Daniel Gimaret, “Cet autre théologien sunnite: Abu¯ l-‘Abba¯s
al-Qala¯nisı¯,” Journal Asiatique 277 (1989): 227–61, esp. at 247–8.
113 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 127a; cf. ff. 129b; 299b.
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these designations to the totality of [man’s] atoms. Were he to separate his atoms
and make each of these atoms living, knowing and capable, that would be
conceivable and sound.114
Hence, a designation (ism) that should, strictly speaking, denote an attribute (s·ifa) that
qualifies an atom can be validly predicated of the composite body as a whole, but only
on account of divine assignment. Whether or not al-Baghda¯dı¯ intends his interpretation
to reflect the position of Ibn Kulla¯b and al-Qala¯nisı¯ is not entirely clear. That in two other
places, he reports that al-Qala¯nisı¯ held that the accidents specific to animate beings can
inhere in a solitary atom (and hence agreed with A1),115 suggests that al-Ash‘arı¯’s
disagreement with al-Qala¯nisı¯ is not ontological, but semantic.
ii. Later Classical Ash‘arı¯s
In contrast to al-Ash‘arı¯, his followers take into consideration the theory of states
(h· a¯l ), advocated by their school-founder’s contemporary Abu¯ Ha¯shim, particularly the
distinction it posits between the classes of accidents that only qualify the atoms they
inhere in and those that qualify the whole composite. Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ and al-Juwaynı¯ both
give this distinction considerable attention partly, it seems, to highlight a major
difference between the Bahshamı¯ position and the version of the theory of states that
they themselves put forth.116 Yet “he among our school-members who denies states”,
al-Juwaynı¯ points out, “need not go into this problem; for the knower’s ‘being a knower’
(kawn al-‘a¯lim ‘a¯liman) to [this school-member] will mean nothing other than the
subsistence of knowledge in it”, i.e. in the entity that is a knower.117 This advice is heeded
by his student al-Harra¯sı¯, who dismisses the notion that an accident can qualify a
composite on the ground that it presupposes the more fundamental theory of states,
which he rejects in toto.118
Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ introduces hisKita¯b al-Insa¯n, as al-Ans·a¯rı¯ reports in the chapter onman
in the Ghunya, by establishing that life does not require a bodily structure (A1).119 The
main objection al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ articulates against the opposite thesis of the Mu‘tazila does
not attack it directly, but instead proceeds to target the related doctrine that an accident
cannot qualify a composite body (A2). He starts with the premise that accidents cannot
inhere in more than one substratum (mah·all )— that is, one atom
120— and from that sets
out a dilemma, according to whether or not life engenders a state for that in which it is
114 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 36b.
115 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, ff. 127a; 129b.
116 On their version of this theory, see: al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 629 ff.; Ahmed Alami, “L’aš‘arisme face à la
théorie des modes,” Philosophie 77 (2003): 45–68; Daniel Gimaret, “La théorie des ah·wâl d’Abû Hâšim
al-Gˇubbâ’î d’après des sources aš‘arites,” in Journal asiatique 258 (1970): 47–86; “H· a¯l,” EI2.
117 Al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 665.
118 Al-Harra¯sı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 43a.
119 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, ff. 154a–b; paraphrased by al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, ff. 84a–b.
120 As already mentioned, the Bahshamı¯s make one exception, namely the accident of composition
(ta’lı¯f ), which inheres in two contiguous atoms (see, for instance, Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 1, 289 ff.).
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present. If, in the first horn of the dilemma, it is conceded that the accident of life, like
the accidents of colour and taste, does not engender a state, the living being would only
be the atom in which life inheres. And it would follow that neither the body as a whole
nor the atoms adjacent to this living atom would have any effect (athar ) thereon.
Though this last point is not justified, the reasoning behind it seems to be this: if a
substratum fulfils all the conditions (shart·) for a cause (‘illa) to effect its properties
(h·ukm), it must be possible for the cause to exist in that substratum. In the second horn,
if it is affirmed that the accident of life does engender a state, that state would only be
engendered for the single atom in which life exists, and would not extend to other
beings, be they connected to that atomwithin a bodily structure or entirely disconnected
from it. For it is only to the being in which an accident exists and to which it is particular
(ikhtas·s·a bi-hi) — that is, the single atom — that the accident engenders its properties.
Otherwise, the accident would engender a state for atoms that exist outside the
composite body of which it is part (an atom in the east, as al-Harra¯sı¯ puts it, would be
qualified by an accident that inheres in an atom in the west),121 since the atom in which
it inheres would have the same relation to them that it has to the other atoms that
comprise the body. Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ adduces that an accident that inheres in an atom, but
affects the composite body, would be analogous to a hypothetical accident that exists in
no substratum but which affects a number of random bodies: the aspect that the two
cases have in common, and for which the former case should be deemed as
inconceivable as the latter, is the absence of any particularity (ikhtis·a¯s·) connecting the
accident to the atoms it affects. Contiguity (ittis·a¯l ), as opposed to separateness (infis·a¯l ),
it is further pointed out, has no effect on the manner in which an accident engenders its
properties.
Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s criticism is continued by al-Juwaynı¯, who lays out several objections
against the notion of bodily states in a section on whether the properties (h·ukm) of a
cause (‘illa) are particular to its substratum or can extend to the composite body as a
whole.122 His main objection is a developed version of al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s argument from
particularity (ikhtis·a¯s·). If it is not accepted that a cause only affects that to which it is
particular, we would have to admit that a single cause could affect all the atoms of the
world. So a cause must be particular to what it affects; and the only valid relation of
particularity between the two is that the former inhere in the latter. The conjunction
(ittis·a¯l ) between an atom that serves as the substratum of the cause and the composite
body of which it is part is only a relation between an atom and a body and hence cannot
be a valid relation of particularity between the cause and body, considering that atoms
are perfectly inert and have no effect on the accidents that inhere therein. To confirm that
the conjunction between an atom and a composite does not engender a causal relation
between the accident that inheres in the atom and the composite, al-Juwaynı¯ further
argues that, considering their inertness, atoms can have no effect on adjacent atoms, and
121 Al-Harra¯sı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 43b.
122 Al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 665–9.
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that each instance of combination (ijtima¯‘) and composition (ta’lı¯f ) only affects the
individual atom that serves as its substratum. Therefore, since neither atoms themselves
nor those accidents that directly account for their composition and aggregation can
influence other atoms within a composite body, it would be harder to believe that other
accidents could extend their effects beyond the atoms in which they inhere.
A further argument is advanced by al-Juwaynı¯’s students, al-Ans·a¯rı¯ and al-Harra¯sı¯:
If the perception that occurs in one part of the body is experienced by the composite,
then the whole composite — that is, all of its constituent parts — would experience
pleasure or pain when instances of pleasure or pain occur in one part of the body. Yet,
it is immediately evident to us that “when pain occurs in a certain locus, for instance
migraine in the head, we know that no pain occurs in the legs”.123 Likewise, capacity can
exist in one arm, and incapacity in the other arm. To the objection that one finds oneself
(nafsa-hu) knowing, and does not detect instances of knowledge in all parts of one’s
body, al-Ans·a¯rı¯ responds that by the same reasoning one does not find each part of his
body knowing. In other words, if I, qua composite, have the state (h· a¯l ) of “being
knowing”, then this state should qualify, and apply equally to, all parts of my body;
however, I do not discern, for instance, my arm sharing in my supposed state of being
knowing.
4.2. Man is Not One
Man, hence, is nothing more than the sum total of his constituent atoms and
accidents. As such, he is neither a “thing” nor “one”. For, as mentioned earlier, the
expressions, “thing” (shay’), or “single thing” (shay’ wa¯h· id), and “entity” (dha¯t), strictly
speaking can be said of simple, indivisible monads, rather than of composite objects.124
And in discussing the “reality andmeaning of ‘one’ (h·aqı¯qat al-wa¯h· id wa-ma‘na¯-hu)”,
125
al-Juwaynı¯ cites al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ defining “one”, used as a conventional term (is·t·ila¯h· ) in
religious contexts ( fı¯ l-diya¯na¯t), as “thing”.126 This, it appears, is not an arbitrary
convention, but is meant to reflect the sense in which God, according to Ash‘arı¯s, is said
to be “one” in the Qur’a¯n (e.g. 2.163; 5.73; 6.19). Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ acknowledges that in
ordinary language (lugha) this expression is used in a different sense, which, it could be
argued, might suggest that “oneness” should not be identified with “thingness”
(shay’iyya): for instance, Arabs would describe “man” as “one” (wa¯h· id), despite being
composed of multiple things (mutarakkib min ashya¯’). He replies:
When the speakers of the language (ahl al-lisa¯n) designate the body (shakhs·) as
“one man”, they do so figuratively (tajawwaza). Likewise, they speak figuratively
when they designate it127 as “one thing”. However, if they consider the reality
123 Al-Harra¯sı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 44a; cf. al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155a; al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 85a.
124 See p. 438, above.
125 On the expression “h·aqı¯qa”, see Frank, Beings and their Attributes, 80–1, n. 5.
126 Al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 345–6.
127 Reading yusammu¯na-hu, rather than yusammu¯na.
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(tah· qı¯q) of this subject matter, and if the fact that man is divisible and consists of
parts becomes evident to them, they will assert that he [comprises] multiple things
and individual beings (huwa ashya¯’ wa-a¯h· a¯d mawju¯da¯t).
128
Since in the strictest sense (h·aqı¯qa) “one” denotes indivisible entities, a composite body
is only one in a figurative sense. For Ibn Fu¯rak, similarly, the expression “one” (wa¯h· id),
used in the strictest and most formal sense, can only be said of indivisible (ghayr
munqasimwa-la¯ mutajazzi’), incomposite things, such as God, an atom and an instance
of the accident black. By contrast, the referent of each of “one man” and “one house”
comprises “in reality multiple agglomerated things” ( fı¯ l-h· aqı¯qa ashya¯’ mujtami‘a).
129
Al-Juwaynı¯ denies that man is one perceiver, for each atom in which perception occurs
is an individual perceiver.130 And al-Faza¯rı¯ contrasts “living” (as a singular adjective or
noun), which properly denotes the atom in which life inheres, though it can be applied
to the whole composite body only in a figurative and loose sense (maja¯zan
wa-ittisa¯‘an), with “man”, which properly denotes a composite body.131
In the same vein, al-Ans·a¯rı¯ considers the objection that it would follow from the
Ash‘arı¯ doctrine “that man must be multiple knowing and capable living beings (ah· ya¯’
‘a¯limu¯n qa¯diru¯n)”, which contradicts the standards of ordinary language. This problem,
he replies, arises purely from the conventions of ordinary language. We predicate “a
living being” of “man” though he contains numerous instances of life, and “moving” (sg.)
of “leg” though each atom therein contains motion. Such applications of “living” and
“moving” are only figurative and do not correspond accurately to reality (h·aqı¯qa), since
only atoms can have attributes.132 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯ suspects that we do not describe an
individual man as “knowing and capable living beings” to avoid the suggestion that
multiple people are intended. Paraphrasing his teacher’s discussion, al-Makkı¯ goes
slightly further in his response to the foregoing objection:
What impossibility is there in that [i.e. asserting that man is “knowers”]! Indeed, he
is such! However, it is not customary to designate these expressions [to the
individual man]. It is, rather, customary to refer to the individual man as “one
knower”. But he is conventionally one ( fard ‘urfı¯), not one in reality ( fard
h·aqı¯qı¯).
133
128 Cited in al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 346.
129 Ibn Fu¯rak,Mushkil al-h· adı¯th, ed. D. Gimaret (Damascus: Institut français d’études arabes de Damas,
2003), 10–11; cf. his student ‘Abd al-Karı¯m al-Qushayrı¯, al-Tah· bı¯r fı¯ l-tadhkı¯r, ed. I. Basyu¯nı¯ (Cairo: Da¯r
al-Ka¯tib al-‘Arabı¯, 1968), 78.
130 Al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, f. 61a.
131 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 104a. Ash‘arı¯s typically analogise this with the figurative (maja¯z)
application of “black” (sg.) when said of a man purely on account of the colour of most of the skin,
despite the fact that internal parts and some external parts are of a different colour (e.g. al-Baghda¯dı¯,
Asma¯’, f. 129b; al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 669; al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155a; al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 85b).
132 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155b.
133 Al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 86b.
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The implication is spelled out unambiguously by al-Makkı¯’s son, the young Fakhr al-Dı¯n
al-Ra¯zı¯, who reasons that man is said to be “one” figuratively; for “each atom of man in
which life resides is living; man indeed is many living beings (al-insa¯n ah· ya¯’
kathı¯ru¯n)”.134
The most detailed extant discussion of the doctrine that man is not a unity and of the
problems it gives rise to is found in al-Ans·a¯rı¯’s Ghunya, where the author turns
seamlessly to the subject following his denial of any intrinsic relationship between
accidents and bodily composites (A1 and A2). He introduces his discussion with the
following remark directed against the Mu‘tazilı¯ antitheses of A1, A2 and A3:
Asserting that bodily structure [is required] and that a property can belong to it, and
affirming its unity (ittih· a¯d) is befitting (yalı¯qu) of those whomaintain that the atom
is [infinitely] divisible, that only a composite [body] produces acts, that it has the
character of a single thing, that the heart is the source of the animal pneuma (ru¯h·
h· ayawa¯nı¯) and the liver the source of the natural pneuma (ru¯h· t·abı¯ ‘ı¯), and that
organs are connected with each other by nerves and veins and have [in their sum
total] the character of a single thing. The Mu‘tazila [by contrast] maintain that the
composite [consists of] aggregated monads, but is made as one by composition
(ta’lı¯f ). For [they accept that] knowledge, capacity and life inhere in atoms within
the composite; so if they then claim that the properties of these attributes apply to
the whole composite, this will be an unsound [position] for them [to take], except
in a loose and figurative manner (‘ala¯ l-tawassu‘wa-l-maja¯z).135
To sustain their claim that man is a unity, the philosophers, hence, can call on two basic
theories of theirs. First, their hylomorphism allows them to conceive of the human body,
not as an aggregate of discrete monads, but as a single, genuinely-unified substance,
which as such could be attributed by a single state that the whole body would, in the
strictest sense, be predicated of. Second, they conceive of the body as a unified organism
that behaves in an integral manner by the activity of both the animal pneuma that
originates in the heart and the natural pneuma that originates in the liver, which are
diffused through the body via the nerves and the veins.136 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, like other classical
Ash‘arı¯s, has no sympathy for these philosophical theories, which receive ample
criticism elsewhere in his book. To refute the philosophical conception of man as a unity,
he would simply address the more basic ontological questions:
If we wish to respond to the exponents of [the theory of] the natures (t·aba¯’i ‘iyyu¯n),
we would begin by offering proofs to affirm both entitative determinants and that
a single entitative determinant cannot inhere in two substrata. After that, whoever
claims that composites can be living by virtue of an [entitative determinant of ] life,
we would declare him stupid-minded.137
134 Al-Ra¯zı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 43a.
135 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 154b.
136 In the Galenic tradition, the animal, or “vital”, pneuma is in fact diffused via the arteries. The nerves
distribute the psychic pneuma, which al-Ans·a¯rı¯ does not mention here.
137 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155a.
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Al-Ans·a¯rı¯ merely intends to point out that as far as the unity of man is concerned, the
philosophers exhibit greater consistency in espousing this notion than do the Mu‘tazila.
The atomist ontology that both they and the Ash‘arı¯s share, in his assessment, does not
allow for such a conception.
The comparison with the philosophers (the so-called t·aba¯’i ‘iyyu¯n, exponents of the
theory of the four natures) is pursued a little further to highlight another inconsistency
in the Mu‘tazilı¯ position. In accordance with their premise that bodily structure is a
condition for attributes (he actually writes, “entitative determinants” [ma‘a¯nı¯]) specific to
animate beings, the philosophers maintain that bodily structure must be a condition for
their properties, and hence do not affirm these properties for God. The Mu‘tazila, by
contrast, contradict (na¯qad·a) their own principle that life requires structure and affirm
the animate being’s attributes for God. This criticism appears to have been advanced
earlier by al-Juwaynı¯.138
Al-Ans·a¯rı¯ then turns his attention to several problems and objections, to be
discussed next, provoked by the denial of the possibility of any ontologically real
property (h·ukm) for the human body as a whole that would engender unity within man.
Some problems begin from either the religious and ethical status of the individual:
whether the obligated agent (mukallaf ) is the whole of the composite body, or only a
part thereof.139 Others begin from our knowledge of the normal workings of the animate
being’s attributes, which we have as human beings: whether or not the different
“occurrences” observable within man and experienced in different bodily loci are
actually experienced by one and the same entity, be that a psychological core
component within the body, or the whole of the body as a unity.
Problem 1. Belief and knowledge. The most primary, cognitive obligation on man, to
have belief (ı¯ma¯n) and theological knowledge (ma‘rifa), is normally the first and main
case in point discussed. Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ and al-Ans·a¯rı¯ describe two configurations that they
regard conceivable. In the first, the accident of knowledge inheres only in the atoms of
the heart. We know that knowledge is located in the heart, according to al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯, by
the consensus of the Muslim community, whereas for al-Ans·a¯rı¯ this is attested
unequivocally in the Qur’a¯n and some h· adı¯ths.
140 Each cardiac atom that serves as the
substratum (mah·all ) of knowledge, to the exclusion of all other atoms of the body,
would be a believer (mu’min mus·addiq) and commanded (ma’mu¯r ) to believe. The
whole composite may also be designated “a believer”, “a knower” or “an unbeliever”,
138 Al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 668. He refers us to the “chapter on man and spirit”, which he probably never
wrote (see p. 436 above).
139 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, ff. 104a; 104b (in the margin, where a passage discussing this question is
cited from al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s Hida¯ya). Al-Juwaynı¯ ([Ibn al-Amı¯r], Ikhtis·a¯r, f. 224b), hence, lists the reality of
man and the spirit among the subtopics of the major subject of the nature of good, evil, justice and
injustice (al-ta‘dı¯l wa-l-tajwı¯r ).
140 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, ff. 155a; 155b; cf. al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, ff. 85b–86a; al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f.
104b (margin). On the locus of knowledge, see also p. 449 above.
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but only as a concession either out of piety and obedience to the Lawgiver (min jihat
al-dı¯n wa-l-ta‘abbud min al-sha¯ri‘), who assigns (tawqı¯f ) the expression “believer” to
the whole composite even in cases in which the referent is not properly a believer (for
instance, during sleep or unconsciousness, when the accident of belief is absent from the
entire body), or in accordance with standard figures of speech used in ordinary language
(lugha), as has already been explained. Al-Makkı¯ writes:
Had revelation not stipulated that the composite ought to be designated a
“believer”, only that atom [that contains belief] would be designated a “believer”;
but since revelation designated the expression “believer” to the totality, we
unhesitantly say that [the composite] is a believer.141
On whether the composite can be a “believer” while asleep, he writes: “His being a
believer is a religious judgement (h·ukm shar‘ı¯), which is based on revelation. Revelation
stipulates that [the composite] is a believer; therefore, he is a believer”.142
In this configuration, al-Ans·a¯rı¯ explains, non-believing atoms in bodily parts other
than the heart cannot be deemed disbelieving (ka¯fir ), since they are not commanded to
believe. Their presence should not contradict the designation of the whole composite as
a “believer”, for two reasons. First, the Lawgiver has stipulated that the same religious
status (h·ukm) that the believing atoms in the heart have should apply to the whole body,
including non-believing atoms. Second, the other parts of the body have been made
subservient (sakhkhara) to the heart, which thus uses (istakhdama) them in accordance
with its knowledge andmotives.143 Though not a unity, the body, hence, is not a disunity.
In the second proposed configuration, which according to al-Ans·a¯rı¯ is suggested in
some h· adı¯ths, the accident of belief will inhere in all the atoms of the composite, which,
qua the sum total of its parts, may then be designated wholly, and hence literally,
“believing”. From the greater attention that the former configuration is afforded by both
al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ and al-Ans·a¯rı¯, it appears that this is their preferred model; and indeed it
accords with the widely-current notion that knowledge and belief occur in the heart, not
throughout the body.144
Problem 2. Can the whole be rewarded or punished for the acts of the part? Contra
the Mu‘tazila, according to whose ethical realism it would be unjust to punish an atom
for an evil act committed by another atom, the Ash‘arı¯s have no ethical qualms to
141 Al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 85b.
142 Al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 86a.
143 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155b; cf. al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 86a; Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 146; al-Juwaynı¯,
Niz· a¯miyya, 246–7.
144 Al-Ash‘arı¯ (Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 146; cf. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 130a) maintains that though it is
rationally conceivable (la¯ yastah· ı¯lu . . . naz·aran wa-‘aqlan) for the same composite to contain
believing atoms, which are rewarded in heaven, and disbelieving (ka¯fir ) atoms, which are punished in
hell, all Muslims are unanimous on the inconceivability of this. For al-Makkı¯ (Niha¯ya, f. 85b), although
the occurrence of such cases is rationally conceivable, it is contrary to the normal course of events
(‘a¯da).
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pronounce that only parts of the body are properly believing or unbelieving. To the
objection, “How does the composite deserve reward or punishment for the belief or
unbelief that exists in the part?”, al-Ans·a¯rı¯ hence responds, in keeping with the standard
anti-realist voluntarism advocated in classical Ash‘arism, that no one deserves
(istah· aqqa) anything, be it reward, compensation or retribution, from God, which He
then is obligated to deliver.145 The existence of belief in an atom in the heart does not
bestow it with any desert of reward, but only represents a sign (‘alam) for both the
reward that the whole composite will receive in the hereafter and the religious obligation
(wuju¯b) on other believers to praise the composite as a whole, just as the Lawgiver
stipulates the tongue’s profession (iqra¯r ) of belief as a sign (‘ala¯ma) for the applicability
of certain legal rulings (h·ukm) to the whole composite.
146
Problem 3. Can one part be rewarded or punished for the acts of another part?
The same voluntarist reasoning applied to cognitive religious obligations rewarded or
punished in the hereafter is invoked to explain punishments (h·udu¯d) stipulated for
offences of the limbs and dispensed while the person is alive. The problem is that in
most cases one part of the body is punished for an offence committed by another
part: How, it is asked, could the back be flogged for the fornication committed by the
sexual organ or the false accusation of fornication (qadhf ) committed by the tongue,
the neck be chopped for the unbelief of the heart or the tongue (in the case of
apostasy), and the right hand be chopped for a theft committed by the left hand?
Al-Ans·a¯rı¯ explains that committing an offence such as these is only a sign that
indicates (‘alam da¯ll ) that it is obligatory on others to dispense the stipulated
punishment, and that God indeed is entitled to forgive grave offences, for instance
when the offender repents, and to inflict retribution even if no limbs have acquired
(iktisa¯b) any offences. An example of the latter is that He permitted the enslavement
of children for the unbelief committed by their parents.147 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯ then argues that
the same argument can be turned against the Mu‘tazila, who claim that the composite,
rather than the hand or the sexual organ, is the true agent that commits theft and
fornication, respectively. Nonetheless, they accept that punishment should be meted
out against other organs and that repentance ought to be performed by the heart,
though neither committed the offence. This, he objects, would be “thoroughly unjust”
(z·ulm mah·d· ) according to the Mu‘tazilı¯ theory of justice.
148
145 Therefore, God is under no obligations and has discretion to reward or punish as He wishes (though
His promise to reward good-doers and punish evil-doers must be trusted). On the theological
voluntarism of classical Ash‘arı¯s, see: Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, 49 ff.; Richard Frank, “Moral
Obligation in Classical Muslim Theology,” Journal of Religious Ethics 11 (1983): 204–23; George
Hourani, “Juwaynı¯’s Criticisms of Mu‘tazilite Ethics,” Muslim World 65 (1975): 161–73.
146 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155a; cf. al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 85b.
147 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155a.
148 Cf. Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 217, where al-Ash‘arı¯ reproduces a similar argument from earlier Mu‘tazilı¯
sources (on which see p. 454 above). On Mu‘tazilı¯ discussions surrounding this problem, see: Sophia
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Problem 4. How could an occurrence in one part lead to an act in another part? It is
argued that had the seeing thing (mubs·ir ) been the substratum of the accident of sight,
then only the organ of sight would be responsible for the act of avoiding a hazard (say,
a well) it detects along the person’s path.149 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯ replies that the composite avoids
the hazard by virtue of the knowledge (‘ilm) it has of the visual perception in the eye,
which “makes the composite equivalent (musa¯wı¯) to the substratum of sight”.150 Two
configurations are conceivable: either knowledge and will are present in each
act-producing atom (juz’ fa‘‘a¯l ) in the body, such as those of the legs that avoid the
hazard, or they are present in the heart, though the act is performed by other bodily
organs, which are subservient to it.
Problem 5. Could different parts of the body act disharmoniously? From the foregoing
notion that will could exist in the act-producing atoms, another problem follows.
Could one leg will (turı¯d) to go in one direction, and the other leg in another
direction? Al-Ans·a¯rı¯’s reply is uncompromising: “The mind does not judge it impos-
sible; yet the normal course of events assures us against its occurrence (al-‘a¯da
a¯manat-na¯ min-hu)”.151 In the hereafter, the normal course of events will be altered,
such that the tongue turns mute and the limbs bear witness and speak, as depicted in
the Qur’a¯n (36.65; 41.20).
Problem 6. Perception, knowledge and speech. The problem is postulated as follows.152
If Zayd hears speech, which his heart then understands, and if the tongue then
responds to the speech heard, will the responder be the tongue, the heart or the
hearer (sa¯mi‘, i.e. the ear)? Al-Ans·a¯rı¯ replies by appealing to the Ash‘arı¯ doctrine of
pre-verbal inner speech, and argues that the true responder is the speaking atom (juz’
mutakallim) in the heart, which acts as a substratum for speech: the tongue merely
reproduces this inner speech in audible form. By doing so, the tongue obeys the
normal course of events preserved by God, in which some bodily organs are made
subservient to others. “God maintains His custom (sunna)”, al-Makkı¯ writes, “such
that some organs are subservient (musakhkhara) to others, and all [organs] are
subservient to the heart”. However, al-Ans·a¯rı¯ considers it conceivable for the tongue
to contain knowledge and perception (idra¯k) of the speech heard (apparently a
reproduction of the auditory perception in the ear), alongside sound, motion and
capacity, though such perception would be called “hearing” only when it occurs in
Vasalou, Moral Agents and Their Deserts. The Character of Mu‘tazilite Ethics (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2008).
149 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155b.
150 Cf. p. 449 above.
151 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155b; cf. the brief summary in al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 86b.
152 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 155b; cf. the brief summary in al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 86b.
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the ear.153 In that case, it seems, the tongue would be, at once, the hearer, the knower
and the speaker.154
5. The Spirit (ru¯h· )
That, thus far, there has been hardly any mention of the spirit is simply a
reflection of the rather vague and marginal role it is assigned in classical Ash‘arı¯
anthropology. From the point of view of Ash‘arı¯ ontology, the need to stipulate a
human soul or spirit did not arise. All human attributes and activities are explained by
a range of accidents that inhere in the atoms of the bodily composite, including
knowledge, thinking, will and perception. At every moment, each accident is recre-
ated or replaced with a different accident by God, who may even choose to annihilate
the whole world, including atoms, and to recreate it before humans are resurrected.
So when the body of Zayd dies and loses all its animate attributes, God can simply
duplicate these attributes when He “restores” (a‘a¯da) Zayd, including his religious
beliefs, memories of his previous life and all other items of knowledge he had before
he died. A spirit would be entirely redundant.
Nonetheless, the Qur’a¯n and H· adı¯th contain frequent and often vivid depictions of
the “ru¯h· ” and “nafs” of individual human beings.
155 And it is only to account for these
scriptural depictions, rather than to explain any properties of man that remained
unaccounted for by the standard means of accidents, that classical Ash‘arı¯s discuss the
“spirit”. Often, however, theologians admitted that their interpretive attempts and
proposed conceptions of the spirit were nothing but speculative guesswork and fell
below the standards of certainty required in the core parts of theology. As evidence that
humans cannot know the spirit’s nature with certainty, some adduce Q. 17.85, “They
question you concerning the spirit. Say: The spirit is of my Lord’s domain. You have been
given of knowledge nothing except a little”.156
If humans, individually, have something called “spirit”, (and all classical Ash‘arı¯s, we
are told, employed “ru¯h· ” and “nafs”, in the sense of “individual spirit”, interchange-
153 According to al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r, Ikhtis·a¯r, ff. 134a–b), an atom capable of perception is capable
of all types of perception. Moses, hence, is said to have heard God’s speech in all his body, not just his
ears.
154 A seventh problem that al-Ans·a¯rı¯ addresses has already been discussed earlier in the present section
(p. 459).
155 As both expressions are considered homonyms (ism mushtarak), theologians attempt to isolate this
sense from occurrences in which they are used in different, irrelevant senses, for instance “the Qur’a¯n”
(Q. 42.52) or “mercy” (58.2) in the case of ru¯h· , and “the thing itself” (dha¯t) (3.28) or “the body” (2.54)
in the case of nafs (for instance, al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 217b; al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, ff. 101b–102a;
al-Ra¯zı¯, Us·u¯l, ff. 179b–180a; al-Bayhaqı¯, al-Asma¯’ wa-l-s·ifa¯t, ed. ‘A. al-H· a¯shidı¯, 2 vols. [Jeddah:
Maktabat al-Sawa¯dı¯, 1993], 2, 48 ff.; 210 ff. For an overview of occurrences in the Qur’a¯n, see: “Soul”;
“Spirit,” Encyclopaedia of the Qur’a¯n).
156 For instance, al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 218a. Al-Faza¯rı¯ (Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 101b) writes, “We cannot be
certain of what it is”.
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ably),157 themost primary question that the sources then ask is whether it is a body (jism),
i.e. a collection of atoms, or an accident. Most sources will also point out that there is
much disagreement (khila¯f ) among earlier school authorities on this matter. The
following positions are attested:
1. “Spirit” refers to the accident of life: a position probably taught by al-Qala¯nisı¯.158
2. “Spirit” refers to the breath: the position of al-Ash‘arı¯ and Ibn Fu¯rak.
3. “Spirit” has two senses, namely life and breath: the position of al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ and, following
him, Abu¯ Ish· a¯q al-Isfara¯’ ı¯nı¯ (d. 418/1027).
159
4. “Spirit” refers to a subtle body embedded within the human body: the position taught by
al-Juwaynı¯.
No classical Ash‘arı¯, it seems, ever proposed that the spirit was an accident other than
life. Though some of these strands appear to have existed concurrently in classical
Ash‘arism, the strand that associates the spirit with the breath, taught by the school
founder and al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯, may have been in vogue during the 4th/10th-century and the
early 5th/11th-century. Ibn H· azm (d. 456/1064), hence, attributes this position to the
Ash‘arı¯s in general.160 The last strand appears to gain prominence in the late-5th/11th and
early-6th/12th centuries, after it was endorsed by al-Juwaynı¯. There are also those who
simply affirm that the spirit is a body, but seem to elaborate no further, the chief example
being al-Baghda¯dı¯.161 In what follows we shall examine these two strands in turn, before
considering the slightly later trend that, around the turn of the 6th/12th century, cast
doubt on both strands.
i. Al-Ash‘arı¯
Ibn Fu¯rak reports that al-Ash‘arı¯ maintained that the spirit is that subtle body (jism
lat·ı¯f ) — i.e. a body comprised of sparsely-dispersed atoms, in contrast to
densely-compacted bodies (jism kathı¯f ) — that goes in and out of the cavities of the
human body (mutaraddid fı¯ taja¯wı¯f a‘d· a¯’ al-insa¯n).
162 As such, it is to be identified with
wind (rı¯h· ), which is simply air particles (hawa¯’) in which motion (h·araka) occurs: when
air moves in a specific manner (‘ala¯ wajh makhs·u¯s·) through the breathing orifices
(makha¯rı¯q), in and out of bodily cavities, and in the presence of life within the body, this
157 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 102a; cf. the Ma¯turı¯dı¯ al-S·affa¯r, Talkhı¯s· al-adilla, 1, 254. “Ru¯h· ”,
however, was the more prevalent term in kala¯m.
158 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 101b. Though, of course, not an Ash‘arı¯, al-Qala¯nisı¯ is often considered
by Ash‘arı¯s to be one of their “ima¯ms”.
159 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 217a; al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 101b.
160 Ibn H· azm, al-Fis·al fı¯ l-milal wa-l-ahwa¯’ wa-l-nih· al, 5 vols. (Cairo: Mat·ba‘at al-Tamaddun, 1321 AH),
4, 69; cf. 5, 74; 76.
161 For instance, al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 105; idem., Asma¯’, f. 205b. The same position finds expression in the
more traditionalist Ash‘arı¯ sources, including al-Khat·t·a¯bı¯ and al-Bayhaqı¯ (see the latter’s al-Asma¯’
wa-l-s·ifa¯t, 2, 213).
162 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 257; cf. Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-Ash‘arı¯, 70–2; 127–8. According to al-Ans·a¯rı¯
(Ghunya, f. 217a), the same conception of the soul is held, unsurprisingly, by Ibn Fu¯rak himself: the
spirit “is that which flows through the cavities of the organs (taja¯wı¯f al-a‘d· a¯’)”.
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flowing air will be called “spirit” (ru¯h· ).
163 As such, the spirit’s relation to the body will be
one of adjacency (muja¯wara), rather than interpenetration.164 It is conceivable that the
atoms of the spirit be either living, by the inherence of the accident of life in them, or
inanimate.165 As evidence of the soul being a body, rather than an accident, al-Ash‘arı¯
reportedly cites the standard expression, “the spirit departed (kharaja)”, and the
Qur’a¯nic verse, “When it [the spirit] reaches the throat” (56.83), both of which indicate
that the spirit can move in space: a feature that distinguishes atoms from accidents.166
Al-Faza¯rı¯ remarks convincingly that by equating “ru¯h· ” with “rı¯h· ” al-Ash‘arı¯ inter-
preted relevant Qur’a¯nic occurrences of the former expression in what he considered a
literal sense: he tended “to preserve the prima facie senses (z·awa¯hir )” of Qur’a¯nic
expressions and “refrained from interpreting them figuratively (ta’wı¯l ) as long as they
yielded [meaning] (ifa¯da)”.167 Literal interpretation was the preferred, default option.
Figurative interpretation was, in principle, only resorted to when a literal interpretation
of an expression rendered the sentence in which it occurred unintelligible or, more
pressingly, when it entailed an impossible consequence (as in the foregoing case of
Qur’a¯nic references to the individual man as “a believer” or “an unbeliever”, and
passages that suggest that God has a location in space). Neither consequence was seen
to arise from the supposedly-literal interpretation of “ru¯h· ” as “flowing air”, or “wind”.
Al-Ash‘arı¯ reportedly compares the presence of the breath-spirit in the body to that
of nourishment (ghidha¯’):
The body is normally sustained (qiwa¯m) by the spirit, just as it is sustained by
nourishment, food and drink. For it is inconceivable (la¯ yas·ih· h·u) that it live in the
absence ( faqd) of nourishment or in the absence of the spirit. For the living being,
to be living, needs (ih· ta¯ja) spirit and nourishment; and the “condition” (shart·) of
the existence of life is the existence of spirit and nourishment.168
Although we are not told exactly how the spirit is a vital component of the living being,
the language used to characterise its relation to the body in this passage indicates that it
is treated as a “condition” (shart·, mus·ah·h· ih· ), or almost as a cause (‘illa), much in the
same way that the accident of life is a condition for the existence of the other animate
being’s attributes. As we shall see shortly, this position is untenable.
163 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 271. Though the identification of the spirit with the breath was ubiquitous,
al-Ash‘arı¯’s definition and treatment exhibit a direct Mu‘tazilı¯ influence (cf. ‘Abd al-Jabba¯r, Mughnı¯, 11,
336; 338; Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-Ash‘arı¯, 127; Heemskerk, “‘Abd al-Jabba¯r,” 133–6; Peters, God’s
Created Speech, 164–5; on the associationmade between spirit and breath, and other conceptions of the
soul advanced in earlier Mu‘tazilism, see van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 4, 513 ff., esp. 515).
164 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 102a.
165 Ibn Fu¯rak,Mujarrad, 257 (ln. 18, readingmawa¯t instead ofmawt); also in al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d,
f. 102a.
166 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 257; cf. Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-Ash‘arı¯, 127.
167 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 102a.
168 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 257; also in al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 102a.
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ii. Al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯
The association between spirit and breath is preserved by al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯, who is said
to have proposed two definitions for the expression “ru¯h· ” when used to refer to
something that exists within the human body. In one set of occurrences, it refers (as
reported by al-Ans·a¯rı¯) to breath (nafas), which is “flowing air that gets diffused (rı¯h·
munbasit·)”; or (as clarified by al-Ans·a¯rı¯’s student al-Makkı¯) it is “flowing air that gets
diffused within the breather (yanbasit·u ‘ala¯ l-mutanaffis)”.
169 In other words, it is further
explained, “spirit” denotes “the atoms of the air (ajza¯’ al-hawa¯’) that enter into the
breathing orifices”, which “are inhaled cold and exhaled warm”.
In the Hida¯ya, al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ offers several arguments to illustrate that life should not
be identified with the spirit (in other words, that a thing becomes living by the entitative
determinant of life, not by the presence of the breath), including the following three.170
First, if life is identified as spirit, all living beings would be described as “spiritual”
(ru¯h· a¯nı¯); however, God is living, but is never given this attribute.
171 Second, we know
that life exists in non-hollow (mus·mat) parts of the body in which there are no gaps
(khalal ) or cavities ( fara¯gh); its substratum, hence, is living but contains neither cold
nor hot flowing air. By the same reasoning, if it is affirmed that the substratum of life
perceives pain, pleasure, heat or coldness because it is living, then non-hollow parts of
the body would be incapable of any of these perceptions. The last two points confirm
that the spirit gets diffused only within bodily cavities. The choice of the verb “inbasat·a”,
which mainly implies spreading on a surface, may be intended to limit the extent of the
diffusion of the breath-spirit to the inner surfaces of bodily cavities.172
In other occurrences, “ru¯h· ” denotes the accident of life. Though the extant sources
shed extremely little light on this view, it seems that al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ may have felt that the
reductive identification of “ru¯h· ” with the breath amounts effectively to a denial of the
existence of a constant individual human spirit, at least in the sense that, critics argue, is
implied in numerous Qur’a¯nic verses and h· adı¯ths: one that can be predicated of
169 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 217a; al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, f. 87b; al-Ra¯zı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 178b. Ibn H· azm reports (Fis·al,
5, 74) that al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ designated life as “nafs”, and breath as “ru¯h· ”, a distinction not mentioned in
extant classical Ash‘arı¯ sources.
170 Cited in al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 102b (margin). The marginal note goes on to cite a further,
mostly illegible discussion from the Hida¯ya, which seems to argue that the spirit is a body and should
not be identified with the accident of life.
171 This, of course, seems to clash with al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s aforementioned view that “ru¯h· ”, in some
occurrences, can denote “life”. He might have held that the latter sense can only be intended when
certain conditions are fulfilled; however, the sources available shed no light on this. On the expression
“ru¯h· a¯nı¯” and its inapplicability to God, see: Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 44; 281 (jinn and angels are called
“ru¯h· a¯niyyu¯n” only because their bodies are akin, in their subtlety, to air); al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 105;
idem., Asma¯’, ff. 124a; 125a; 255a; idem., Farq, 325.
172 A note in the margin of al-Faza¯rı¯’s Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (f. 101b) seems to confirm this sense. It cites the
lexicographers’ opinion that the original sense of “rawh· ” is “inbisa¯t·”, and supports that with the
expressions “qadam rawh· a¯’”, “a foot spreading (munbasit·) in its fore part”, and “arwah· ”, one who has
such feet (cf. Edward Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon [London: Williams and Norgate, 1863–1893],
1183).
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attributes (maws·u¯f ), can survive the death of the body, and can be transported in
space.173 As Ibn H· azm remarks in his criticism of the Ash‘arı¯ conception of the spirit, it
would be absurd to claim that the air inhaled and exhaled, which changes with every
breath, could be a component of the individual human being that survives the death of
the body.174
The difficulty is overcome by the second definition of “ru¯h· ” that al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ offers.
This develops an earlier notion used by al-Ash‘arı¯ to account for reports concerning the
inquisition and torment in the grave, namely that God can create life and perception in
some of the atoms of the deceased person’s body.175 Al-Ash‘arı¯, however, apparently
never refers to this accident of life as “spirit”. It is possible, the school founder asserts,
“that God, exalted, create life in the atoms in which He had created death, [i.e. the atoms
of Zayd’s body,] and then cause them pain by creating instances of pain in them”. It is
the atoms of Zayd’s body that are meant to be tormented; life and perception are created
only to allow this torment to occur. Neither atom nor life, in this case, could aptly be
designated “spirit”, considering that scriptural occurrences of this expression are not
confined to references to the inquisition and torment in the grave.
Crucial developments can be detected in al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s position, gleaned from the
exiguous accounts available in later sources. To account for h· adı¯ths that affirm the
posthumous survival of “the spirits of martyrs and the spirits of the family of Pharaoh”,
he suggests, according to Ibn H· azm, that if the “spirit” is identified with life, it may
survive death: “Either the accident of life becomes seated (yu¯d· a‘u) in the most minute
part of the body”, that is, in a fragment of the original body, even one as small as an atom.
“Or another body is created for that life (li-tilka l-h· aya¯t)”, for instance the body of a
bird.176 The choice of words used in Ibn H· azm’s direct quotations is peculiar, especially
when compared to al-Ash‘arı¯’s much simpler, “God creates life in the atoms”. Both
“seated” (or “placed”) and “for that life” suggest that the life in question is the same as177
the life that existed in the body at the moment of death, as though it is transferred to a
new substratum. The original substratum becomes secondary and dispensable, as the
individual’s life can be reproduced in a substitute body. Moreover, the continuance of
life seems uninterrupted in al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s account, whereas al-Ash‘arı¯ implies that life is
only created just as the inquisition and torment commence.
173 For instance, al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 102b; al-S·affa¯r, Talkhı¯s· al-adilla, 1, 255–6.
174 Ibn H· azm, Fis·al, 5, 76–7.
175 Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad, 170–1.
176 Ibn H· azm, Fis·al, 5, 77. On “bird traditions” that state, for instance, that the spirits of martyrs will dwell
in green birds and that those of the family of Pharaoh in black birds, see: van Ess, Theologie und
Gesellschaft, 4, 523–5; Ragnar Eklund, Life Between Death and Resurrection According to Islam
(Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1941), 16–20.
177 That is, inasmuch as Zayd’s life and knowledge at any given instant are the “same” as his life and
knowledge in the previous moment. In classical Ash‘arı¯ occasionalism, an accident subsists for no more
than an instant and must be recreated or replaced with a different accident at each instant.
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This is certainly how Ibn H· azm understood al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯: not only from the snippets
he reproduced, but from the complete text he had at his disposal. For he objects that “an
accident cannot be taken back (tuwuffiya), such that it departs from ( fa¯raqa) the body
that bears it, and then continues to exist (baqiya) in that state”. This is “inconceivable; for
the accident ceases to exist when it departs from its substratum”.178 Ibn H· azm then
condemns the notion that life (the spirit) can be reproduced (nusikha) in another body,
such as the body of a bird, on the grounds that it amounts to metempsychosis (tana¯sukh)
straight and simple.179
The significance of the posthumous survival of the accident of life lies in that it
allows its substratum to receive the other animate attributes of the individual, which, as
explained earlier, are conditional upon life. According to al-Faza¯rı¯, those who equate
“ru¯h· ” with life defend this position against the objection that the “entity predicated of
attributes” (maws·u¯f ), depicted in various Qur’a¯nic verses and h· adı¯ths, cannot be the
accident of life itself; for one accident cannot be qualified by another. They respond that
the entity in question is not life itself, but rather the atom in which life inheres.180 This
most probably was a point made by al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯, the main figure to whom al-Faza¯rı¯
earlier ascribes the definition of “spirit” as “life” and to whoseHida¯ya he had access. The
endurance of those attributes that encapsulate the individual’s identity, including
potentially all items of knowledge, hence allows for the possibility of an uninterrupted
survival of the individual beyond the death of the body. What endures of Zayd and ‘Amr,
if anything does endure, is not only the life that each of them has, but furthermore, for
instance, their belief or unbelief, memories, acquisitions, desert of reward or punish-
ment, and perception of the happenings and experiences, described in scripture, which
the spirit goes through in the period between the death of the body and resurrection.
This, to my mind, underpins al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s identification of the spirit with life. Whether
he believed that the spirits of all human beings survived the death of the body, or
confined that to those of the aforementioned privileged or damned classes mentioned
expressly in the H· adı¯th, is unclear.
181 Either way, he appears to be the first to offer this
explanation for the possibility of the posthumous survival of the spirit.
ii. Al-Juwaynı¯ and al-Qushayrı¯
The identification of the “spirit” as either breath or life was influential in late-fourth/
tenth- and early-fifth/eleventh-century Ash‘arism: it was taken on board by al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s
178 Ibn H· azm, Fis·al, 5, 76.
179 Ibn H· azm, Fis·al, 5, 77.
180 Al-Faza¯rı¯ (Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 102b) reports this response, but rejects it in favour of al-Juwaynı¯’s
conception of the spirit.
181 According to a citation in al-Ans·a¯rı¯’s Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (MS Aya Sofia, f. 269a), al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ interpreted
“Alla¯h yatawaffa¯ al-anfus” (Q. 39.42), not as “God takes back the souls”, but as meaning that God
“creates life in man until he reaches his appointed time (ajal )”; when this appointed time arrives, God
“omits to create life; so he dies”. This suggests that the individual’s animate attributeswould cease to exist
and disappear at the moment of death, and consequently that only some human spirits survive death.
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“followers”,182 as well as Abu¯ Ish· a¯q al-Isfara¯’ ı¯nı¯. An alternative theory of the soul,
however, already had some following within the school, although the identity of its
exponents among fourth/tenth-century Ash‘arı¯s remains unclear. This disagreement
within the school is reported by al-Qushayrı¯ in the Risa¯la, which he completed in
438/1046. He writes in the section on the spirit (ru¯h· ):
The “spirits” are subject to disagreement among the critical investigators of the
Sunnis. Some assert that it is life. Some assert that it refers to entities (a‘ya¯n) that are
seeded (mu¯da‘) in these bodily structures (qa¯lib), which are subtle (lat·ı¯f ), and that
God sustains the normal course of events (‘a¯da) by creating life in the structure as
long as the spirit exists in its body. Man, hence, is living on account of the [accident
of] life. The spirits, [by contrast,] are seeded in the structures. [. . .] The traditions
(akhba¯r ) confirm that [“spirit”] denotes subtle entities.183
The expression “a‘ya¯n” here means “body” or “atoms”, as opposed to accidents.184 In the
previous section, on the “ego” (nafs), he writes that the spirit is a “body of subtle form”
(min al-ajsa¯m al-lat·ı¯fa fı¯ l-s·u¯ra), just as angels and demons have subtle bodies.
185 As
explained earlier, “subtle body” simply means “a sparsely-dispersed body”. Beyond this
basic identification of the spirit as a subtle body within the visible human body,
al-Qushayrı¯’s anthropology has predominantly-Sufi concerns, which deserve a separate
treatment.
The theory that the spirit is a subtle body gained prominence slightly later when it
was endorsed by al-Juwaynı¯, who writes in the Irsha¯d:
If it is said, “Explain the ‘spirit’ and its reality (ma‘na¯); for there has been
disagreement on this”. We say: The soundest position (al-az·har ), in our view, is
that the spirit consists of subtle bodies intermingled with the sensible bodies
(ajsa¯m lat·ı¯famusha¯bika li-l-ajsa¯m al-mah· su¯sa). God, exalted, sustains the normal
course of events (‘a¯da) such that the life of [the sensible] body continues (istimra¯r )
as long as [these subtle bodies] continue (istamarra) to be intermingled with them.
If they depart ( fa¯raqa) from them, death, in the normal course of events, will
succeed life.186
After death, the spirit is transported, following some h· adı¯ths, in the crops of green birds
to be deposited into heaven or hell.187 In contrast to the breath-spirit of earlier Ash‘arı¯s,
al-Juwaynı¯’s spirit is not identified with breath and does not flow through orifices and
182 As confirmed by Ibn H· azm (Fis·al, 5, 76) and al-Faza¯rı¯ (Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 102b).
183 Al-Qushayrı¯, Risa¯la, 1, 205.
184 Cf. Abu¯ l-Mu‘ı¯n al-Nasafı¯, Tabs·irat al-adilla, ed. C. Salamé, 2 vols. (Damascus: Institut français de
Damas, 1990), 1, 44 ff., where “a‘ya¯n” is used in the same sense.
185 Al-Qushayrı¯, Risa¯la, 1, 204.
186 Al-Juwaynı¯, Irsha¯d, 377.
187 Al-Juwaynı¯, Irsha¯d, 377. Al-Naz·z· a¯m is reported to have identified the spirit as life intermingled
(musha¯bik) with the body; but his physical theory was very different from that of classical Ash‘arism
(see ‘Abd al-Jabba¯r,Mughnı¯, 11, 310; al-Baghda¯dı¯, Farq, 117; van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 3, 309
ff.).
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into bodily cavities, but is intermingled with the body, including its non-hollow parts.
Unlike flowing air, which can be sensed on account of its motion and temperature, this
subtle body seems to be insensible: hence the contrast with the “sensible” bodies with
which the spirit is intermingled.188 Al-Juwaynı¯ agrees with his predecessors that the
atoms of the spirit can conceivably be either living by the inherence of the accident of
life in them, or inanimate.189
How exactly the spirit is intermingled with the body, al-Juwaynı¯ does not explain
here. After all, two composite bodies, as he argues in the Sha¯mil, cannot interpenetrate
each other (tada¯khul ) and hence cannot be co-located.190 Yet this physical principle
does not apply to subtle bodies, an example being the jinn who, according to
al-Juwaynı¯, indeed can interpenetrate (da¯khala) human bodies.191 In discussing how an
angel can penetrate the earth to reach a buried corpse and conduct the inquisition in the
grave, the young Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯ explains that this does not imply the co-location
and interpenetration of bodies, which would be inconceivable. Rather, since angels are
subtle bodies, “it is conceivable that they penetrate in the gaps among the atoms of the
earth, just like water seeps into” the ground. We also know, he adds, that angels visit us
day and night without being obstructed by the walls that surround us.192 This
undoubtedly reflects al-Juwaynı¯’s understanding of the manner in which the spirit is
intermingled with the body. Embedded in the human body, the atoms of the spirit have
a special, yet unexplained, status, which makes them distinct from, say, the atoms of the
flesh.193
Although, like al-Ash‘arı¯’s and al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s breath-spirit, al-Qushayrı¯’s and
al-Juwaynı¯’s bodily spirit is concomitant with life, there appears to be a crucial difference
in how this concomitance is understood. As we have seen, al-Ash‘arı¯ (at least as reported
by Ibn Fu¯rak) depicts the breath-spirit as a condition (shart·, mus·ah·h· ih· ) for life.
Al-Juwaynı¯ must have been aware that the existence of an atom can be a condition only
for those accidents that inhere in it, but never for the existence of other atoms or of the
accidents that inhere in them: a point, as we have already seen, that he stresses in his
refutation of the Mu‘tazilı¯ doctrine that bodily structure is a condition for the existence
of life.194 The presence of the atoms of the spirit within the body, therefore, cannot be a
188 However, al-Baghda¯dı¯ (Asma¯’, f. 205b) notes that Ash‘arı¯s who maintain that the spirit is a body
claim that the dying person can see his spirit departing from him with his eyes.
189 Al-Faza¯rı¯ (Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, ff. 102a–b), who accepts al-Juwaynı¯’s theory of the spirit, argues that the
spirit must have life; for various Qur’a¯nic verses and h· adı¯ths indicate that the spirit continues to know
and perceive following the death of the body.
190 Al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 160–2.
191 Al-Juwaynı¯ (Ibn al-Amı¯r), Ikhtis·a¯r, ff. 103a; 238b.
192 Al-Ra¯zı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 177b.
193 Though having a special “status”, the atoms of the spirit are normal atoms. All atoms, according to
classical Ash‘arı¯s, are homogenous (e.g. al-Baghda¯dı¯, Us·u¯l, 52–5). The notion that the spirit is a body
unlike sensible bodies is attributed to the metempsychosists (Us·u¯l, 53).
194 See p. 457–8 above. On that the existence of the substratum is a “condition” for the existence of the
accidents it receives, see al-Juwaynı¯, Sha¯mil, 711–13. Al-Ash‘arı¯ reportedly (Ibn Fu¯rak, Mujarrad,
T M W • V 102 • J/O 2012
472 © 2012 Hartford Seminary.
cause or a condition for any attributes of the atoms of the body, including life. This point,
as we shall see shortly, is stated explicitly by al-Juwaynı¯’s students.
So although, with al-Juwaynı¯, the spirit is promoted to become a special body of
atoms embedded in the living composite rather than mere breath, it is, in another
respect, demoted in being deprived of any intrinsic vital functions as either a cause or a
condition that engenders any property for the composite. The concomitance between
the spirit and life becomes based entirely on God’s direct preservation of the normal
course of events (which al-Juwaynı¯ mentions twice in the last citation and also appears
in al-Qushayrı¯’s definition). Unlike most other occurrences in the created world, not
even a semblance of causality is admitted here.195 And al-Juwaynı¯ would agree with
al-Baghda¯dı¯ that it is possible (ja¯’iz,mumkin) for God to bestow life on a being that has
no spirit, or to instil a spirit in an inanimate thing, although the latter does not occur in
the normal course of events.196
Al-Juwaynı¯’s conception of the soul is accepted in some extant late-fifth/eleventh-
and sixth/twelfth-century Ash‘arı¯ sources that were influenced by him, including
al-Mutawallı¯, al-Faza¯rı¯, al-Makkı¯ and the young Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯, who support it
with an array of scriptural evidence.197 This commitment, however, is not shared by his
two most important kala¯m students, to whom we shall now turn.
iii. Al-Ans·a¯rı¯
Al-Juwaynı¯’s student al-Ans·a¯rı¯ objects, first of all, to the notion that the spirit is a
body of some sort that either engenders, or is a condition to, the existence of life and
other animate properties in the human body. He argues that since the homogeneity
(taja¯nus) of all atoms has already been established, if one atom is a spirit on account of
its essence (li-nafsi-hi), then absolutely all atoms must likewise be spirits on account of
their essence. An “ensouled” body would then be intrinsically “spiritual” (ru¯h· a¯nı¯) and in
need of no extra spirit-atoms. However, the human body is not intrinsically spiritual on
account of its essence. Therefore, the spirit can “be neither a body nor an atom”.198 “No
body”, he further argues, “can affect another body” (la¯ athar li-jism fı¯ jism).199
280–1) maintained that bodies could not affect other bodies. So although a jinn, being a subtle body,
can penetrate the human body, it cannot directly affect it, though it may indirectly influence the
person’s behaviour by whispering (waswasa) to him.
195 Al-Juwaynı¯’s contemporary al-Mutawallı¯ (Mughnı¯, 57) paraphrases his short section on the spirit,
including the emphasis on God’s preservation of the normal course of events, but strangely states that
“the spirit causes life (al-ru¯h· mu¯jib li-l-h· aya¯t)”. This position is evenmore untenable, in classical Ash‘arı¯
thought, than treating the spirit as a condition, unless we read “mu¯jib” in a non-technical sense.
196 Al-Baghda¯dı¯, Asma¯’, f. 205b; idem., Us·u¯l, 105.
197 Al-Faza¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d, f. 102a; al-Makkı¯, Niha¯ya, ff. 88a–b; al-Ra¯zı¯, Us·u¯l, ff. 178b–180a.
Al-Mutawallı¯ (Mughnı¯, 57) duplicates al-Juwaynı¯’s definition, but uses “combined” (mujtami‘), rather
than “intermingled”.
198 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 217b; idem., Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (MS Aya Sofia), f. 268b.
199 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Ghunya, f. 217b.
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Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, therefore, views al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s identification of the spirit as the accident of
life favourably. He describes this thesis as “good” (h·asan), but does not go any further
to defend or elaborate it.200 Instead, he concedes the possibility that the spirit be a body
of some sort, but with an important caveat: that it be acknowledged that God maintains
the association between the existence of the spirit and the continuation of life simply as
“the normal course of events”, rather than on account of the former being a “cause” for
the latter (ja‘ala dha¯lika ‘a¯datan la¯ ‘illatan).201 The spirit may be an inanimate body (jism
jama¯d) similar to the blood, nourishment and the breath, which neither cause life nor act
as conditions for it, but are simply concomitant (la¯zama) with it: God normally creates
the accident of life in the human body as long as He creates these other bodies, and
normally omits to create life in the absence of any one of them.202 Though he accepts the
conceivability of this, al-Ans·a¯rı¯ is non-committal and appears to suspend judgement on
whether the spirit is a body or an accident.
iv. Al-Kiya¯ al-Harra¯sı¯
Al-Juwaynı¯’s other student al-Harra¯sı¯ goes further and does not hesitate to reject
his teacher’s doctrine that the soul is a subtle body embedded in the dense (kathı¯f )
body of man.203 He uses the same argument put forth by al-Ans·a¯rı¯: the spirit cannot
be a body, “because we have already demonstrated that bodies [i.e. atoms] are
homogeneous; so if one body is a spirit, all bodies would be spirits”. Moreover, “if it
is conceivable for one body to become living by a body that is adjacent to it
(ja¯wara-hu), it would have been possible for Zayd to become living by ‘Amr”.204 The
spirit, therefore, is an accident, though al-Harra¯sı¯ does not explain whether or not it
is identical to life.
It is possible to reconcile this conception of the spirit with h· adı¯ths that indicate that
the spirits of the believers (al-Harra¯sı¯ does not specify martyrs) are in the crops of green
birds in heaven or “in lanterns hanging beneath the Throne”. For the accident of spirit
could inhere in an atom of the individual’s body, which is transported to that heavenly
realm, while the rest of the body, despite being reduced by an infinitesimal atom, would
otherwise remain unchanged. In contrast to al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯, al-Harra¯sı¯ does not suggest that
the substratum that receives the accident of spirit could be other than the original body
in which it inhered.
Conclusion
As well as being the product of the school’s brand of atomism, classical
Ash‘arı¯ anthropology moreover reflects man’s ambivalent status in classical kala¯m as
200 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (MS Aya Sofia), f. 269a.
201 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (MS Aya Sofia), f. 269a.
202 Al-Ans·a¯rı¯, Sharh· al-Irsha¯d (MS Aya Sofia), ff. 268b–269a; idem., Ghunya, ff. 217b; 218a.
203 Al-Harra¯sı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 248a. Al-Harra¯sı¯’s position is reported by Sayf al-Dı¯n al-A¯midı¯ (Abka¯r al-afka¯r,
ed. A. M. al-Mahdı¯, 5 vols. [Cairo: Da¯r al-Kutub wa-l-Watha¯’iq al-Qawmiyya, 2002], 4, 274).
204 Al-Harra¯sı¯, Us·u¯l, f. 247b.
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both an epistemic starting point for several major doctrines concerning divine nature
and the focus and ultimate object of knowledge in other theological contexts. God
and man were investigated and conceptualised within the same ontological frame-
work, and the priority was almost invariably given to the articulation of sound
doctrines and arguments about God, even where they entailed rather unattractive
doctrines about man, most obviously here the denial of the unity of man for the sake
of affirming the unity of God. The result of this kala¯m theocentrism, as we have seen,
is an ontologically fragmentary conception of man, despite the occasional appeal to
cardiocentrism, which affords the heart a central cognitive role and renders the other
parts of the body subservient to it. This implication, however, did not deter our
theologians, who were satisfied that the attributes specific to animate beings, which
they postulated, offered a sound explanation for all the occurrences and activities that
took place within the human individual.
There was no theoretical need to postulate anything other than the bodily structure
and the accidents that inhered in its atoms. Account, however, had to be taken of the
numerous references to the “spirit” in the Qur’a¯n and the H· adı¯th. Refusing to add
another ingredient to the body, some felt that they could reduce the “spirit” to the
attribute of life, or explain it away as the mysterious air that flows through the nostrils
and mouth in and out of the body. That the names of the spirit (ru¯h· , nafs, nasama) were
etymologically related to names of flowing air (rı¯h· , nafas, nası¯m) even suggested that
“breath” was a conveniently literal interpretation of “spirit”. For others, this conception
failed to explain various scriptural depictions of the spirit, and hence posited a subtle
body within the human body, which may depart from it, travel in space and experience
the posthumous occurrences described in revelation.
As a subtle body, however, the spirit seems only to exacerbate the fragmentary
constitution of man: it is distinct from the human body, has no association with either the
heart or any of man’s animate attributes, and has no function to play in the living being.
Its role and status become even more problematic following death, when it departs from
the body and begins to have its own experiences in a non-terrestrial realm while parts
of the body are subjected, independently of the spirit, to an inquisition and possibly
punishment in the grave.
Although the question why, in the late fifth/eleventh century, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and al-
Ra¯ghib al-Is·faha¯nı¯ turned away from this theory of man towards a philosophically-
influenced body-soul dualism goes well beyond the scope of our present article, we can
safely speculate that they must have been mindful of the failings and limita-
tions of classical Ash‘arı¯ anthropology. To al-Ghaza¯lı¯, the investigation of human
ontology served, first and foremost, not as a starting point for doctrines concerning divine
nature nor to define the subject of obligation (mukallaf ), but to articulate a soteriology of
ethical and noetic development. In a variety of ways, the Avicennan model proved more
conducive to this new anthropocentric and introspective orientation in Ash‘arı¯ thought.
The spirit (ru¯h· , nafs) that, as a subtle body, had a redundant and problematic status was
promoted to become a separate and incorporeal rational soul, which became the
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principle for the unity of the individual. Yet the doctrine of the rational soul faced serious
opposition in late classical Ash‘arism since it clashed with key school tenets; and it was
only assimilated fully by Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯ around the turn of the seventh/thirteenth
century. This will be the subject of a further study.
Appendix
A New Source: Al-Faza¯r ı¯ ’s Sharh· al-Irsha¯d
MS London, British Library, OR. 9645, of 126 folios of text, contains the last volume of
a multi-volume (either three- or four-volume) commentary on al-Juwaynı¯’s Irsha¯d. The
portion commented on in this volume is from the beginning of the chapter on prophecy
to the end of the book, although some folios aremissing at the end (it, hence, corresponds
to Irsha¯d, pp. 302–424). The text is transcribed in a clear Maghribi script; and the margins
contain numerous notes and additions, which appear to be in the same hand. The
marginalia, unfortunately, are often illegible because of worming and water damage.
The author’s name stated in the Latin script on the spine of the codex, bound in the
early twentieth century,205 is Ibn al-Mar’a, that is, the Andalusian Ibra¯hı¯m ibn Yu¯suf (d.
611/1214–15), who indeed is known to have written a four-volume commentary on this
work.206 Of the original title page, only two small fragments have survived, one bearing
a note indicating that the copy is an autograph, “Sharh· Irsha¯d Ima¯m al-H· aramayn
rah· ima-hu Alla¯h bi-khat·t· al-mus·annif ”. The author’s name is not given.
In the main text, however, the author’s comments are frequently introduced by, “‘Alı¯
ibn Muh· ammad said” (e.g. f. 1a). In some cases, the name is appended with, “may God
prevent him from error (‘as·ama-hu)” (f. 20b), “forgive his sin (ghafara . . . dhanba-hu)”
(f. 22a), “guide him (waffaqa-hu)” (f. 101b), etc., rather humble phrases that confirm that
this indeed is an autograph copy. The only Maghribi commentator on the Irsha¯dwith this
name is ‘Alı¯ ibn Muh· ammad al-Faza¯rı¯ (b. 509/1115; d. Granada, 552/1157 or 557/1162),
also known as Ibn al-Nafzı¯, who reportedly entitled his commentaryManhaj al-sada¯d, or
Minha¯j al-sada¯d fı¯ sharh· al-Irsha¯d.
207 This work is one of the earliest extant commentar-
ies on the Irsha¯d; and in the long tradition of commentaries on this work in the Maghrib,
it is probably second only to a commentary written by Abu¯ ‘Abd Alla¯h Muh· ammad ibn
Muslim al-Ma¯zarı¯, who moved to Egypt (d. Alexandria, 530/1136). Al-Faza¯rı¯’s commen-
205 According to a note on a flyleaf, the codex was bought from the well-known collector Abraham
Shalom Yahuda (1877–1951) on 10 October 1925.
206 See Peter Stocks, Subject Guide to the ArabicManuscripts in the British Library, ed. C. Baker (London:
British Library, 2001), 97. On Ibn al-Mar’a, see, for instance, Khalı¯l ibn Aybak al-S·afadı¯, al-Wa¯fı¯
bi-l-wafaya¯t, Vol. 6, ed. S. Dedering (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972), 171.
207 On him see, for instance: ‘Umar R. Kah· h· a¯la, Mu‘jam al-mu’allifı¯n, 7 vols. (Damascus: al-Maktabat
al-‘Arabiyya, 1967–1961), 2, 491; Ibn ‘Abd al-Malik al-Marra¯kushı¯, al-Dhayl wa-l-takmila, ed. I. ‘Abba¯s, 8
vols. (Beirut: Da¯r al-Thaqa¯fa, 1965), 5, 282–5; Ibn Farh· u¯n al-Ma¯likı¯, al-Dı¯ba¯j al-mudhahhab fı¯ ma‘rifat
a‘ya¯n ‘ulama¯’ al-madhhab, ed. M. A. Abu¯ l-Nu¯r, 2 vols. (Cairo: Da¯r al-Tura¯th, 1972), 2, 115–16. Some
published sources name him, it appears incorrectly, “Ibn al-Baqarı¯” or “Ibn al-Muqri’”, rather than “Ibn
al-Nafzı¯”.
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tary, used here for the first time, is a valuable new classical Ash‘arı¯ source, both in that it
sheds light on the highly developed state of Maghribi Ash‘arism in the early sixth/twelfth
century and in the surprising wealth of material it cites from earlier, non-extant sources
that were at the author’s disposal, including works by al-Ash‘arı¯, al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯, al-Juwaynı¯
and Maghribi authors. No other manuscript copies of this work are known to be
extant.
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